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are encouraged to submit their research to the Working Paper Series. Besides, any
other collaborative research, joint work or scientific contributions of visiting research
fellows of the PRC would be considered for publication in the series.
The publication will be determined purely on the basis of the quality of the
manuscript. The manuscript must be sufficiently detailed to include an important
research question and objectives, a theoretical focus, an adequate review of literature,
a clear description of suitable data and methods used, and meaningful analyses with
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It is with profound pleasure to introduce the research by Tomáš Sobotka on fertility
transitions in the post-communist countries of Europe. Fertility in most of the
European nations is either below or very close to replacement levels. Much of the
recent changes in fertility are attributed to individual choices and opportunities. Rapid
changes in social, economical, political or cultural systems function as catalysts in
determining individual fertility choices and behaviour. A dramatic fall in fertility
levels in the formerly communist societies, particularly observed during the 1990s,
initiated tremendous discussion on the patterns of decline with a focus on the age,
period and cohort effects. A comprehensible derivation of how these changes
(processes) occurred and how individual fertility behaviour is embedded in a dynamic
and evolving context seem to be largely unexplored. Earmarking the year 1989 as a
reference point– the fall of communist political systems, Tomáš investigated the
fertility changes in the post-communist European countries distinguishing two distinct
patterns; an intensive and a slow postponement behaviour of partnership formation,
marriage, childbearing and related demographic events. Although a little extensive, I
found this research very promising and well synchronised with a fine blend of facts
and figures. I recommend this publication as a potential source for researchers
interested in the Central and Eastern European demography.
I am sure you will enjoy reading it.
Sabu S. Padmadas, Editor
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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a detailed evidence on recent fertility changes in the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe and offers an interpretation of these changes. It
focuses on the ten-year period of 1989-1999, which witnessed the most intensive
changes in childbearing patterns, such as rapid decline in period fertility rates,
postponement of childbearing and an upsurge in the proportion of non-marital
births. Changes in fertility are analyzed with the use of data collected by national
statistical offices, further complemented by evidence from the FFS surveys
(Fertility and Family Survey) and RHS surveys (Reproductive Health Survey).
The paper discusses the notion of a socialist greenhouse - an artificial
environment that shaped people’s lives during the communist era. Changes in
fertility and family formation over the 1990s are perceived as results of the
collapse of the socialist greenhouse, which was mutually facilitated by two basic
dimensions: broader social changes and new economic constraints. Particular
attention is paid to the rapidly evolving differentiation of fertility patterns across
Eastern Europe and the role of the cultural-religious tradition in this
differentiation.
Keywords  Fertility ?  Central and Eastern Europe ?  Low fertility ?
Postponement of childbearing ?  Reproductive behavior ?  Fertility decline
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1. INTRODUCTION
“The notion that the recent fertility decline reflects more than a reaction to the
economic crisis, increased opportunity costs for women, or large cohorts
following small ones gains further support from the observation that other
changes in the family followed in the wake of this fertility decline and they too
have the appearance of a fundamental transition” (Ron Lesthaeghe on Western
Europe (1983, p. 416))
The avalanche of events that led to the demise of authoritarian communist
regimes swept through countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe in the
‘revolutionary year’ 1989 and reached its climax with the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991. The political division of Europe into the East and West, clearly
distinguishing the members of the two competing political blocs and two different
social and economic systems for more than four decades, has come to an end,
paving way to the less clear-cut political, social and economic differentiation of
Europe. Most post-communist societies struggled to implement democratic
institutions and market economy. The legacy of the totalitarian past – backward
and inefficient economy almost completely managed by the state, egalitarian
social structure with marginalized middle strata and lack of democratic tradition
in most countries – presented more difficult obstacles to the reforms than was
initially expected. Thus the profound social changes brought both new
opportunities and constraints and resulted in increasing differences between
countries of Central and Eastern Europe1.
Radical social and economic transformation generated a strong impetus for the
subsequent change in demographic behavior of populations in this region.
Fertility patterns, initially characterized by early and almost universal
childbearing and by a strong attachment to the two-child family norm, have
                                                                
1 For simplicity, the term Eastern Europe is used for the whole group of European post-communist
countries included in the analysis. This follows a concept of Eastern Europe that evolved from the
peculiar development of the region after the end of the Second World War. However, this does not
correspond with the historical cultural division between Eastern European and Western European
civilization, following roughly the division between Orthodox Christianity and Catholic or
Protestant Christianity (see Dingsdale, 1999).
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changed rapidly over the 1990s. Substantial decline in period fertility has taken
place in all post-communist countries of Europe, which now form the lowest-
fertility region in the world with the total fertility rates (TFR) ranging between 1.1
and 1.4 in 1999. Strong reduction of fertility during the 1990s, accompanied by a
rapid increase in non-marital childbearing and by the postponement of first births,
seemingly indicates a uniform adjustment of population to the ongoing process of
economic and social changes.
The dynamic changes of Eastern European demographic landscape and fertility in
particular has received attention of many researchers referring either to individual
countries2 or to Eastern Europe in general3. Lesthaeghe (2000), Lesthaeghe and
Moors (2000) and Macura et al. (2000) discussed fertility changes in the former
communist countries in a broader European context. An interesting discussion has
evolved around several issues: Why has fertility decline and fertility change in
general proceeded so fast? What are the major causes of fertility changes; are
economic difficulties and decline in living standards more important than new
opportunities and increased freedom? Is Eastern Europe experiencing the same
transformation as the Western European societies since the mid-1960s? What is
the impact of the postponement of births on period fertility in this region? Are the
fertility patterns in Eastern Europe becoming more heterogeneous? Is the East-
West demographic division of Europe, once identified by Hajnal (1965) in the
case of nuptiality, disappearing or just being modified?
This paper aims to provide a detailed evidence on fertility changes in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe over the 1990s and to offer an
interpretation of these changes. In doing so, it touches most of the questions posed
above. The overview in the third section of the paper looks at the fertility changes
in a longer time perspective. Developments in fertility are presented along with
the evidence on changes in family formation and with the data on contraceptive
use and induced abortion. In the fourth part, the notion of a “socialist greenhouse”
– an artificial environment that was permeating people’s employment
opportunities, educational choices and life transitions – is introduced as a basic
                                                                
2 e.g. Conrad et. al (1996), Rabušic (1997), Fratzak (1998), Sackmann (1999), Barkalov (1999),
Rychtaríková (2000), Zakharov (2000), Konietzka and Kreyenfeld (2001) and contributions in
Kucera et al. (2000).
3 UN ECE (1999), UN ECE (2000(1)), Philipov and Kohler (2001), Philipov (2002).
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interpretative scheme of the functioning of the previous regime of demographic
reproduction. This environment, characterized by limited opportunities,
uniformity and a high degree of familism, effectively prevented many changes in
fertility to progress earlier, as was the case of Western and Northern Europe since
the mid-1960s. The interpretation pertaining to the dissolution of the socialist
greenhouse in the 1990s focuses on two dimensions that mutually facilitated
fertility changes: broad social changes and new economic constraints. The most
important aspects of social and economic changes are discussed in more detail
and they are linked to various theories and views on fertility change. Particular
attention is paid to the rapidly evolving differentiation of fertility patterns across
Eastern Europe, which are to some degree associated with the cultural-religious
tradition.
Fertility changes in European post-communist countries
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2. DATA AND METHODS
The data were collected from various sources. Basic data on fertility, abortion and
other demographic indicators originate from the Council of Europe (2000, 2001)
and from EUROSTAT (2001, 2002). Detailed data on births by birth order
(biological birth order) and age of mother and data on the age structure of women
were obtained from EUROSTAT (2001, 2002), from national demographic
yearbooks (CNPS, 1990-1997; CSU, 2000a, 200b; FSU, 1981-1989 (1) and (2);
HCSO, 1981-2000; GUS, 1991-2000; SORS, 2000), directly from the Statistical
Offices (CNPS, 1998; CSU, 2000b; DASS, 1999) and from the research papers
(Boleslawski, 1993; Philipov and Kohler, 2001; Steshenko, 2000). Data for
Russia as well as the data for Slovakia and Lithuania before 1994 were obtained
by courtesy of several colleagues. Indicators related to cohabitation, contraceptive
use and mother’s status at first birth were compiled from the published tables of
the FFS (Fertility and Family Survey, 1991-1998) Standard Country Reports and
RHS (Reproductive Health Survey, 1993-1999) conducted in many countries of
the region throughout the 1990s. Most of the social and economic indicators come
from the following sources: EUROSTAT (2001, 2002), FV (2000), Halman
(2001), UN HDR (2000), UN ECE (2000 (2), 2001), and Zohoori et al. (1999).
In total, 16 regions – 15 countries and the region of the former GDR – have been
selected for the comparative analysis. To allow a concise comparison of a large
amount of data, some figures are presented as arithmetic means4 for 4 distinctive
regions: Central Europe including East Germany, South-Eastern Europe, Baltic
Republics and the Post-Soviet Republics, grouping remaining European states of
the former Soviet Union (Table 1). For Croatia and East Germany as well as for
the Post-Soviet Republics, only a limited amount of data is available and therefore
they are not included in many figures5. Apart from Croatia and Slovenia, other
                                                                
4 Arithmetic means were chosen rather than weighted means (weighted by the population of given
countries) due to the large differences in population size between various Central and Eastern
European countries. Weighted means would mostly mirror the situation in a few large countries of
this region, e.g. Russia among the Post-soviet Republics (146 million out of 209 million inhabitants
in 2000) or Poland among the Catholic belt countries (38.7 million out of 52.3 million inhabitants in
2000).
5 Moreover, Croatia presents an additional problem. Demographic development in the country was
influenced by the civil war that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991. The inclusion of
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successor states of the former Yugoslavia as well as Albania were excluded for
the lack of data, specific demographic developments influenced by recent civil
wars (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and distinctive
history or cultural tradition6.
In addition to the geographical division, selected data are organized according to a
broadly defined cultural tradition. Some demographic indicators, such as the
prevalence of non-marital childbearing, are differentiated more by the influence
of religious and cultural tradition than by the geographical position of the country.
Basically, countries are divided into the three groups. The group of traditionally
Roman Catholic countries is further divided into two subgroups, one of the
countries with a relatively high religiosity (“Catholic belt”: Croatia, Lithuania,
Poland and Slovakia) and another, marked by a strong secularization (Czech
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia)7. Countries characterized by the historical
influence of Protestantism (which was, however, always mixed with a strong
presence of Roman Catholicism), namely Estonia, Latvia and East Germany, form
the second group. These are highly secularized societies, with East Germany
being an extreme case8. Nations of South-Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet
Republics form a group of countries with Christian Orthodox tradition.
The presentation of recent fertility transformations in Section 3 is complemented
by an estimation of the effects of fertility postponement on the period fertility
proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998 and 2000). This method enables to
estimate the “tempo” and the “quantum” components of period fertility, the latter
being the level of the period TFR that would be reached in the absence of changes
in fertility timing.
                                                                                                                                                                  
Croatia in the Central European region is based on cultural tradition (part of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, dominance of the Roman Catholic religion) and on the country’s demographic
characteristic.
6 For an overview of demographic changes in the Balkan countries in the 1990s, see Sardon (2001).
7 The distinction was based on the data on religiosity from two sources: European Values Study data
from 1999 published in Halman (2001) and Census data presented in Fischer Weltalmanach (FV,
2000).
8 According to the results from the ISSP (International Social Survey Program) 1998, 69 % of
people in the former GDR declared themselves to be non-religious (Hamplová, 2000).
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Table 1: Geographic and cultural-religious division of Central and Eastern
Europe and European macro-regions presented in the figures
Unless given otherwise, indicators shown in the figures represent arithmetic averages for countries
specified in the table
Division of countries of Central and Eastern Europe
a. Economic and geographic proximity b. Cultural-religious tradition
1. Central Europe 1. Dominantly Roman Catholic





Slovak Republic 1b "Catholic secularized"
Slovenia Czech Republic
2. South-Eastern Europe Hungary
Bulgaria Slovenia
Romania 2. Dominantly Protestant
3. Baltic states Estonia
Estonia Former GDR
Latvia Latvia
Lithuania 3. Dominantly Christian Orthodox






Division of European macro-regions
Eastern Europe 16 regions specified in the table above
Northern Europe Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
Western Europe Austria, Belgium, France, Western Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom
Southern Europe Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
Fertility changes in European post-communist countries
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3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON RECENT CHANGES IN
FERTILITY AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
Demographic distinctiveness of Eastern Europe as a relatively homogeneous
region had gradually developed between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. In 1985,
there was a clear demographic division between Eastern and Western Europe
(Monnier and Rychtaríková, 1992, p. 157). A cleavage along political boundaries
has replaced the geocultural line identified by Hajnal in 1965 (Ní Bhrolcháin,
1993, p. 463). Political blocs constituted specific level of spatial organization,
manifested also by contrasting fertility development (Decroly, 1993). The Eastern
European patterns of fertility behavior in the mid-1980s were characterized by a
strong attachment to the two-child family, with only a few women remaining
childless or having large families, by an early entry into the family, early start of
childbearing (compared to the Western European standard) and by a subsequent
short spacing of births. Reproductive life was marked by a low prevalence of
modern contraception and high incidence of induced abortion. Pre-marital
conceptions were common9, while non-marital births were relatively rare (except
for several countries).
The 1990s brought a complex transformation of this reproductive model. Table 2
summarizes the basic characteristics of fertility change in the period 1989-1999 in
16 post-communist countries. The following section deals with recent fertility
changes in more detail. Particular attention is paid to the postponement of
childbearing, increasing differences in period fertility by birth order, rapid spread
of non-marital births and the diffusion of cohabitation as well as to the changes in
abortion rates and contraceptive use.
                                                                
9 In the Czech Republic, about half of the first marital births were conceived before marriage during
the 1980s (FSU, 1981-89 (1)). In Poland, 49 % of first children were born within 9 months
following the marriage in 1990 (GUS, 1991).
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3.1. Long-term changes in period fertility
Since the 1960s, the total fertility rates in Central and Eastern Europe contrasted
with fertility in other parts of Europe (Figure 1). In Hungary, Estonia and Latvia,
the TFR fell below 2.0 already at the beginning of the 1960s, while many parts of
Europe experienced a moderate baby-boom. In the 1970s and 1980s, various
measures of population policy10 together with other factors (see discussion on the
socialist greenhouse) prevented fertility in Eastern Europe from a decline
experienced in all other European regions. Finally, in the 1990s, a sharp fall in the
TFR shifted the position of Eastern Europe on the European fertility map from the
Figure 1: Total fertility rate in European regions, 1960-1999
For definition of the regions, see Table 1
                                                                
10 A large variety of pronatalist and social policy measures included child benefits (often
progressively increasing with the number of children in the family), paid maternity leave and the
provision of daycare for children (see Klinger, 1991). Moreover, restrictions of access to abortions
were imposed in several countries at the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s (Blayo, 1991). In
Romania and in the Soviet Union, employed unmarried men and employed childless women had to
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“highest fertility” to the “lowest fertility” region within one decade.
The level of fertility in Eastern European regions in 1980 and in 1998 was close
to Southern Europe, where the post-war fertility decline started later and was
more pronounced than in Northern and Western Europe (Figure 2). Nevertheless,
apart from Central Europe, an intensive decline in the TFR in the post-communist
countries was concentrated entirely into the short period of the 1990s. In several
countries of Central Europe, especially in Slovenia and in the former GDR, the
decline in period fertility had started already in the 1980s.
A steep decline in the period fertility over the 1990s indicates a seemingly
uniform reaction to an uneasy and complex transformation of the post-communist
societies. However, a more detailed look at the changes in the timing and
composition of fertility depicts a growing diversity in fertility patterns across
Eastern Europe.
Figure 2: Total fertility rate in Eastern European regions and in Southern Europe
1980-1999
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Table 2: Overview of basic indicators of period fertility in the post-communist countries of Europe,
1989-1999 (part 1)
Population TFR TFR Change Adjusted TFR TFR 1 TFR 2 TFR 3+
2000 1989 1999 TFR 89-99 avg.1997-99 1998 1998 1998
Central-Eastern Europe
Croatia (CRO) 4 568 1.67 1.38 -0.29 .. .. .. ..
Czech Republic (CR) 10 278 1.87 1.13 -0.74 1.67 0.527 0.446 0.183
Hungary (HUN) 10 043 1.82 1.28 -0.53 1.71 (97-98) 0.574 0.441 0.312
Poland (POL) 38 654 2.08 1.37 -0.71 1.74 0.620 0.452 0.363
Slovak Republic (SR) 5 399 2.08 1.33 -0.75 1.77 0.576 0.460 0.338
Slovenia (SLO) 1 988 1.52 1.21 -0.31 1.67 0.602 0.461 0.170
Former GDR (GDR) 15 217 1.57 1.11 -0.46 .. .. .. ..
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria (BG) 8 190 1.90 1.23 -0.67 1.38 0.646 0.349 0.116
Romania (ROM) 22 456 2.21 1.30 -0.91 1.51 0.684 0.382 0.254
Baltic states
Estonia (EST) 1 439 2.21 1.24 -0.97 1.61 0.604 0.381 0.222
Latvia (LAT) 2 424 2.05 1.16 -0.89 1.56 0.562 0.340 0.195
Lithuania (LIT) 3 699 1.98 1.35 -0.63 1.63 0.647 0.485 0.231
Post-soviet republics
Belarus (BEL) 10 020 2.03 1.29 -0.74 .. .. .. ..
Moldova (MOL) 4 282 2.78 1.39 -1.39 .. 0.771 (96) 0.537 (96) 0.305 (96)
Russia (RUS) 145 559 2.01 1.17 -0.84 1.47 (95) 0.721 1) 0.372 1) 0.143 1)
Ukraine (UKR) 49 851 1.94 1.10 -0.84 .. 0.840 (94) 0.446 (94) 0.167 (94)
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Table 2: Overview of basic indicators of period fertility in the post-communist countries of Europe,
1989-1999 (part 2)
TFR <20 TFR 30+ MAB MAB 1 Change in % nonmarital % nonmar. Change in %
1999 1999 1999 1999 MAB1 89-99 1989 1999 nonmar. 89-99
Central Europe
Croatia (CRO) 0.081 0.426 27.56 25.4 1.5 6.6 8.2 1.6
Czech Republic (CR) 0.073 0.273 26.86 24.59 2.11 7.9 20.6 12.7
Hungary (HUN) 0.117 0.358 27.07 24.84 1.74 12.4 28.0 15.6
Poland (POL) 0.089 0.389 27.28 24.33 0.98 5.8 11.7 5.9
Slovak Republic (SR) 0.126 0.305 26.39 23.82 1.17 7.2 16.9 9.7
Slovenia (SLO) 0.038 0.382 27.98 26.13 2.60 23.2 35.4 12.2
Former GDR (GDR) 0.064 0.329 27.47 .. .. 33.6 49.9 16.3
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria (BG) 0.243 0.193 24.67 22.98 0.89 11.5 35.1 23.6
Romania (ROM) 0.193 0.254 25.54 23.52 0.94 .. 24.1 ..
Baltic states
Estonia (EST) 0.130 0.320 26.56 23.80 0.80 25.2 54.0 28.8
Latvia (LAT) 0.099 0.299 26.78 24.18 1.28 15.9 39.1 23.2
Lithuania (LIT) 0.130 0.335 26.50 23.77 0.40 6.7 19.8 13.1
Post-Soviet republics
Belarus (BEL) 0.152 0.230 25.39 22.62 (98) 0.38 7.9 17.8 9.8
Moldova (MOL) 0.266 (97) 0.307 (97) 25.4 22.19 (96) .. 10.4 16.6 6.2
Russia (RUS) 0.152 0.234 25.90 23.16 (98) 0.39 13.5 27.9 14.4
Ukraine (UKR) 0.206 (98) 0.186 (98) 24.7 (98) .. .. 10.8 17.4 6.6
Explanations:
Population Population on  January 1, in thousands
TFRi Parity-specific period TFR (parity i, biological parity)
Adjusted TFR Bongaarts-Feeney (1998) tempo-adjusted period total fertility rate
TFR <20 Cumulative fertility rates of women below age 20
TFR 30+ Cumulative fertility rates of women aged 30 years and more
MAB Mean age of mother at childbearing (computed from the age-specific period fertility rates)
MAB1 Mean age of mother at birth of first child
Data sources: Council of Europe (2001), EUROSTAT (2001, 2002), DASS (1999), Steshenko (2000) and unpublished data 
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3.2. Changes in the timing of fertility marked by the postponement of
childbearing
Early age at childbearing was one of the most distinctive features of Eastern
European reproductive pattern. While the postponement of first births has
gradually spread in all Eastern European regions through the 1990s, the large
distance from other European regions in the timing of first births remained
virtually unchanged (Figure 3). However, there were substantial differences in the
speed of the postponement across Eastern Europe. Since the delay of childbearing
has a depressive effect on the period TFR, regional differences in the
postponement may yield different interpretation of the very low fertility in various
Eastern European regions.
The “ aging of fertility” has been manifested earlier in Central Europe, especially
Figure 3: Mean age of mother at birth of first child in European regions
Post-Soviet Republics         Data for Belarus and Russia only
Western + Northern Europe       Data for the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Sweden
Catholic belt        Data for Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic
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in the more secularized countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia), where the
mean age of first mothers grew by 1.7 (Hungary) to 2.6 (Slovenia) years between
1989 and 1999. The postponement was probably even more intensive in the
former GDR, for which the indicator is not available 11. The Post-Soviet Republics
and the Baltic states initially experienced a decline in the mean age of first
mothers since the end of the 1980s, but this trend reversed around 1994.
Available data indicate that in the second half of the 1990s, first births were
postponed to some extent in all post-communist countries. In Central Europe,
Baltic states and South-Eastern Europe the postponement has already progressed
by a faster pace than in Western and Northern Europe, where it has been slowing
down.
Postponement of first births proceeded hand in hand with the decline in the first-
parity fertility rates (TFR1). Although it started in Eastern European countries at
much lower ages than in other regions in Europe, the TFR1 and the mean age of
mother at birth of first child (MAB1) are likely to follow a similar transition
characterized by four distinctive stages (Figure 4):
1. Initial stage: High TFR1 and relatively low MAB1 ;
2. Onset of the postponement manifested by a decline in the TFR1 and
increase in the MAB1;
3. Continuing postponement: TFR1 stabilizes at a low level, while the
mean age of first mothers continues to grow;
4. Postponement stops: As the mean age of first mothers approaches
the age of 30, the postponement gradually slows down or stops and as
a result the TFR1 increases again, although not to the initial level.
In Figure 4, the ongoing transition in several post-communist countries is
compared with the Netherlands, which has already reached the final stage and
with Italy, where the postponement of first births is still going on (Stage III.). In
most countries of Eastern Europe, the postponement is progressing relatively fast
and the depressing effect on the first-order fertility rates is more pronounced. The
                                                                
11 In Germany, births are registered according to the birth order within marriage. Since the majority
of first births in East Germany take place outside marriage, statistics on first births within marriage
is not comparable with the data for other countries, referring to biological  (‘true parity’) births.
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Figure 4: First-parity TFR (TFR1) and the mean age of mother at birth of first
child. A comparison of selected countries, 1970-2000
figure also illustrates the persistency of the postponement, discussed by Kohler et
al. (2001): once initiated, the postponement transition in the low-fertility countries
is long-standing and irreversible, leading to a substantial delay of childbearing
among the mothers of first children.
Due to the shift towards later childbearing, fertility decline did not affect all age
groups of women equally. High fertility rates of adolescent women declined
steadily, initially in the Catholic secularized countries and in South-Eastern
Europe, and by the mid-1990s in all Eastern European regions (Figure 5a). At the
end of the 1990s, two Christian Orthodox regions – South-Eastern Europe and the
Post-Soviet Republics – were characterized by considerably higher fertility rates
among teenage women than Central Europe and the Baltic states. Because of the
rapid decline of initially high fertility rates of young women in the Catholic
secularized countries, the differences between them and the countries of the
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fertility rates of women past age 30 (Figure 5b) shows an inverse picture to the
previous one, with the Christian Orthodox countries having the lowest fertility
rates of older women after the steady decline in older-age fertility in the first half
of the 1990s. The convergence of the two Catholic regions occurred due to the
gradual increase in fertility among women aged 30+ in the Catholic secularized
countries.
The over-30 fertility rates may serve as an indicator showing whether a
recuperation of fertility at older ages is taking place (see Lesthaeghe and Moors,
2000). Since the mid-1990s, there were signs of fertility recuperation among
women aged 30+ in the Catholic secular and Protestant regions and stabilization
following the previous decline in other regions. More precise view on the
changing fertility patterns by age is provided in Figures 6a and 6b displaying age-
specific fertility rates in Central Europe 12, Romania, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia
and the European Union13 in 1989 and 1999. The 1989 fertility profile clearly
differentiates quite homogeneous profiles of Eastern European countries from
much older age-profile of the EU countries. In Eastern Europe, childbearing was
highly concentrated into the narrow age span of young women, particularly ages
19-24. Moldova was an extreme case of very high fertility at that age. Since 1989,
mothers in the EU countries have become even older and fertility profiles of
Eastern European regions have been more differentiated along the age axis. In all
of them, fertility decline caused “flattening” of the fertility schedules without a
clear concentration of childbearing into few age groups. The childbearing patterns
have become more heterogeneous, mirroring an increasing diversity of fertility
strategies among various groups of women.
An increasing diversity in the timing of childbearing resulted in the increase in the
interquartile range14 in the age of first mothers. In the 1980s, childbearing was
                                                                
12 Arithmetic average of the age-specific fertility rates (single years of age) for the Czech Republic,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
13 Arithmetic average of the age-specific fertility rates (single years of age) for three distinctive
countries – Finland, the Netherlands and Spain.
14 Interquartile range in the mean age of first mothers is a difference between the age, when 25 %
women (lower quartile) and 75 % women (upper quartile) give a birth to first child according to the
distribution of fertility schedule in a given year.
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Figure 5a and 5b: Cumulative age-specific fertility rate of women below age 20
(5a) and above age 30 (5b) in Eastern European regions, 1980-1999 (per 1000
women)
For definition of the regions, see Table 1
highly concentrated into a narrow age interval, with interquartile range at first
birth standing between 4 and 5 years. Since then, it has increased considerably,
reaching about 6.5 years in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Figure 7). This
evidence supports the idea of two different reproductive strategies coexisting
temporarily besides each other: one pursued by the more family-oriented women
who follow older habits of marrying early and having children early and another,
typical of the “trend- setting” women postponing birth till higher age15.
The age profile of childbearing in Central Europe has moved closer to the EU
profile, while mothers in two Post-Soviet countries, Russia and Moldova,
                                                                
15 Sircelj (2000, p. 333) has characterized two types of family formation taking place in Slovenia –
“traditional” and “modern”; similarly Fratzak (1998, p. 16) has identified two types of procreational
behavior in Poland and Zakharov (2000, p. 307) has distinguished between the “modern family
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Figure 6a and 6b: Age-specific fertility rates of women in selected countries and
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Figure 7: Interquartile range in the mean age of first mothers in some Eastern
European countries and in the Netherlands; 1985-2000
remained very young. The position of Lithuania and Romania is intermediate. The
relative changes in the age-profiles between 1989 and 1999 further illustrate this
differentiation. In most countries (except Russia), there was a very strong
reduction in fertility among young women aged 18 to 24, typically by 40 to 50 %,
and exceeding 60 % among Central European women aged 19 to 21. Compared to
the 1989 level, there was some recuperation in fertility among women aged 30+ in
Central Europe, while other regions saw a decline in fertility also among older
women, which was particularly strong in Romania 16.
                                                                
16 Romania is a special case due to the extreme pronatalist policy of N. Ceausescu’s regime, which
lasted till 1989. Most women in Romania did not have access to abortion and contraceptive means,
and their fertility, particularly at older ages, considerably exceeded the desired fertility (see Hord
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3.3. Decline of fertility due to the postponement of births? Timing effects in
period fertility
What was the effect of changes in fertility timing on period fertility rates? Several
researchers have already applied the fertility adjustment method proposed by
Bongaarts and Feeney (1998 and 2000) in case of Eastern European countries
(Macura et al., 200017, Philipov and Kohler, 2001, Philipov, 2002). Two points
are discussed here: What would be the level of the TFR in the second half of the
1990s, would there be no changes in fertility timing? What proportion of period
fertility decline since 1985 may be attributed to a real reduction in fertility
quantum and what part of the fertility decline may be attributed to the temporary
timing (tempo) shifts? The year 1985 serves as a benchmark year, when the timing
changes still did not affect fertility in most Eastern European countries. Therefore
the TFR in 1985 is, with some simplification, assumed to mirror only the fertility
quantum (or the fertility level) of this year.
At the end of the 1990s the postponement of motherhood was already taking place
in all post-communist countries and the adjustment shows considerably higher
levels of fertility than the ordinary TFR (Table 2 and Table AP-3). Five Central
European countries display a very similar level of the adjusted TFR in 1997-1999,
ranging between 1.67 (Czech Republic, Slovenia) and 1.77 (Slovak Republic).
These relatively high values indicate a strong influence of the postponement on
the period fertility. The adjusted TFR in the three Baltic states is only slightly
lower when compared with Central Europe (1.56-1.63), while the evidence for the
South-Eastern Europe and Russia (data for 1994-1995) puts the adjusted TFR to a
relatively low level, particularly in Bulgaria (1.38) 18. The Russian situation is
                                                                
17 The adjustment computation presented by Macura et al. (2000, Table 1) is not precise, since the
reference year for the adjustment is not fully corresponding with the period used for the computation
of changes in fertility timing.
18 Philipov (2002, p. 11) pointed out that the TFR in Bulgaria might be underestimated due to the
unregistered emigration. Performing a simple estimation of the TFR in 1998, he suggested that the
TFR was more likely 1.3 instead the registered level 1.1, that is by 10 % higher. A comparison of
the official population statistics for 1st January 2001 and the results of the Population Census for 1st
March 2001 (BNSI, 2002) revealed that the registered population of women aged 20-39 exceeded
the Census population by 5.2 %. Thus, provided that the Census was complete, the underestimation
of the TFR is likely to be about 5 %.  Similar underregistration probably occurred in several more
countries with a fairly large unregistered emigration, namely in Croatia, Estonia and Latvia. The
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likely to be typical of other Post-Soviet countries, where the delay of childbearing
has been only modest so far. If the postponement of childbearing would come to
an end, countries of Central Europe and the Baltic states would probably show
higher period fertility levels than Bulgaria, Romania and the Post-Soviet
Republics.
Due to the different pace of the postponement, countries with roughly equal
period TFR in 1997-99, such as Bulgaria (1.14), Latvia (1.13) and the Czech
Republic (1.15) display different levels of the adjusted TFR (1.38, 1.56, and 1.67
respectively). The role of the timing change was uneven across the region. In the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, the TFR decline since 1985 was mainly
driven by the postponement of childbearing (the tempo component in Figure 8). In
two other Central European countries, Poland and Slovakia, and in the Baltic
States the effects of the timing change were substantial as well (between 33 and
Figure 8: Estimates of the tempo (timing) and quantum components in the decline
of the period TFR, 1985-1997/99
Notes: 1) Recent figure refers to the 1997-1998 period
2) Recent figure refers to the 1994-1995 period
                                                                                                                                                                  
increase in the TFR in Estonia and Latvia in 2000 was therefore partly an effect of the adjusted
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45 %). On the other hand, the postponement of births had a smaller depressive
effect on the period TFR in Bulgaria (30 %), Romania (20 %), and Russia (16 %
in 1994-1995).
3.4. Period fertility by birth order: increasing differences
The analysis of fertility rates by birth order, based on incomplete evidence19,
further depicts increasing differences between Eastern European regions as well
as the importance of the timing changes discussed in the previous section. The
first-parity TFR (TFR1) was for several decades approaching the level of 1.0 as
almost all women had at least one child. Only 5 to 10 % of Eastern European
women born around 1960 remained childless. Since the 1980s, Central Europe
has emerged as a region with low levels of the TFR1, reaching the average of 0.57
in 199920 (see Table AP-7). Other regions, especially the Post-Soviet Republics,
were characterized by the higher levels of the TFR1 throughout the 1990s.
The position of different regions with regard to the period fertility of the second
birth order is contrasting with the first one. Generally, countries with currently
higher TFR1 have seen more intensive decline in the second-parity TFR and
countries with low levels of the TFR1 rank higher with respect to the TFR2. Figure
9a illustrates this contrast in the case of the Czech Republic (a strong reduction in
the TFR1) and Romania (initially a strong decline in the TFR2). This is partly
related to the different speed of the postponement of births across Eastern Europe.
In countries with the strong reduction of the TFR due to the timing effects, there
was a strong decline in the first-parity TFR and a less pronounced reduction in the
TFR of parity two. This pattern is typical of Central European countries: many
women are postponing or even giving up childbearing, but once they have a child,
a large majority of them decides to have the second one.  In contrast, in countries,
where the postponement was slower, with the fertility decline driven mostly
                                                                
19 For Croatia, Belarus, and the former GDR, no data on the parity distribution of births by age of
mother or the age structure of women were available for the 1990s. For Ukraine and Moldova, no
recent data were available.
20 This cannot, however, be interpreted as an indicator that 43 % of women will potentially remain
childless. A large part of the period fertility decline is due to the postponement of births and not due
to definitive resignation of women on childbearing.
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Figure 9a: TFR of the first and second parity in the Czech Republic and
Romania, 1989-2000
Figure 9b: Bongaarts-Feeney adjusted TFR of the first and second parity in the
Czech Republic and Romania, 1989-2000
by the quantum effects, there was a strong initial reduction in the second-parity
fertility. The parity-specific adjustment of the TFR for the timing effects in the
Czech Republic and Romania over the 1990s (Figure 9b) shows that the major
difference between them is not in the first-parity fertility, but in the proportion of
women who choose to have second child once they have one. If the fertility rates
and the pace of the postponement of the late 1990s would continue, about 80 % of
Czech and Romanian women would ultimately have a child; however, 70 % of
Czech women and only 40 % of Romanian women would have the second one.
Romanian pattern of parity-specific fertility change was also characteristic for
Bulgaria and for the Post-Soviet Republics.
This evidence may be interpreted in a following way: in South-Eastern Europe
and in the Post-Soviet countries most women want to have at least one child,
despite very difficult living conditions. However, among women having first
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general acceptation and spread of one-child family model. Two short remarks on
the attitudes towards childbearing among Russian women made by Avdeev and
Monnier (1995, p. 34) illustrate this point. Widespread attitude coined as “at least
one child, at most two” is combined with a strong effort to have really at least
one: “Come what may, Russian women have one child at least, unless they are
sterile”. Higher progression to the second child in Central Europe may be
attributed to a more stable environment, but selection effects play a role there as
well. We may assume that women who are having children now are especially
those behaving more “traditionally”, while women postponing births will not be
so much willing to embrace the two-child family norm in the future.
The differentiation of countries according to the cultural-religious tradition shows
interesting regional patterns regarding the third and higher-parity fertility (TFR3+).
Since 1990, three Christian Orthodox countries with available data - Bulgaria,
Romania and Russia - have reached the lowest levels of fertility of the third and
higher parity. In Russia, in 1994-1996 the TFR of third and higher birth order
contributed only 10.4 % to the overall TFR, indicating that the families with three
and more children have been virtually disappearing. On the other hand, in several
countries of Central Europe (Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic), the TFR3+
formed around 25 % of the overall TFR, indicating that many women there
continue having larger families. Generally, there was a trend towards the
convergence between the two groups of Catholic countries, with the more
secularized countries experiencing only a very slight drop in higher-order fertility
and more religious countries experiencing a gradual decline. The stability of
fertility rates at higher parities in many Central European countries may be partly
associated with the higher fertility among the distinctive minority of Romany
people (Gypsies), especially in the Czech Republic, Hungary and in the Slovak
Republic.
Considering current distribution of period fertility by parity, the Post-Soviet
countries and to a smaller extent also the Baltic states and South-Eastern Europe
may witness further reduction of the already very low TFR. Due to the substantial
decline in the second and higher-parity TFR, TFR1 is contributing by 50 to 60 %
(even 62 % in Russia in 1995) to the overall TFR. Potential speeding-up of the
postponement of first births, inevitably leading to the decline in the TFR1, may
bring about further decline in  period fertility, with the TFR dropping below 1.0.
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 3.5. Diffusion of non-marital childbearing
A rapid increase in the proportion of children born out of marriage was – besides
the changes in the level and timing of period fertility – the most characteristic
feature of recent fertility transformation in Eastern Europe. The spread of
childbearing outside marriage is associated with two related developments:
decline in marriage rates and increasing popularity of informal unions.
Till the 1980s the proportion of children born out of marriage did not exceed 10
% in most countries of Eastern Europe. In several countries, particularly in
Estonia, Slovenia, and in the former GDR, there was an earlier diffusion of non-
marital childbearing and cohabitation. This situation changed during the 1990s,
when all Eastern European countries saw an upsurge in the proportion of children
born out of marriage (Figure 10a). However, the differentiation within Eastern
Europe in the intensity of non-marital childbearing has increased enormously
(Figure 10b).
The cultural-religious division establishes a clear differentiating factor for the
spread and plausibly also for the acceptance of non-marital childbearing.
Countries with a strong Protestant tradition – Estonia, former GDR and Latvia –
experienced the most dynamic upsurge in non-marital childbearing during the
1990s. With the average proportion of non-marital births reaching 48 % in 1999,
these countries resemble a similar situation in (also traditionally Protestant)
Northern Europe. As more than half of the first children were born out of
marriage, the complete disconnection of marriage and reproduction was taking
place there over the 1990s21.
Among the historically Catholic and Christian Orthodox countries, the dividing
line is established according to the degree of traditionalism and secularization in
these regions. There is an increasing differentiation between the Catholic
secularized countries, where the proportion of non-marital births reached values
                                                                
21 In 1998, the birth rate in East Germany among unmarried women was higher (27.8 births per
1000 unmarried women aged 15-49) than among married ones (27.6 per 1000). This pattern was
observed for the first time (see Grünheid and Roloff, 2000, p. 35, Table 12)
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Figure 10a: Proportion of children born out of marriage in European regions,
1980-1999
Figure 10b: Proportion of children born out of marriage in Eastern European
regions, 1980-1999 (cultural-religious regions)
“Orthodox I.”: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine
“Orthodox II”: Bulgaria, Romania, Russia
For definition of other regions, see Table 1
comparable with Western European countries and the Catholic belt countries,
experiencing only a gradual increase in the share of non-marital births. Their
position resembles the Catholic countries of Southern Europe. Similarly, there
was an increasing differentiation between the two groups of traditionally
Orthodox countries; one that may be coined as more “traditional” (Belarus,
Moldova, Ukraine)22 and another manifesting more “modern” behavior (Bulgaria,
Romania, Russia). In the latter group, the proportion of non-marital births has
been increasing considerably throughout the 1990s.
                                                                
22 It is difficult to define precisely what “tradition” means in these societies. In my view, it is a
mixture of religious revival (present especially in Moldova and Ukraine) and a nostalgia for the old
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Increase in non-marital childbearing was accompanied by a declining propensity
among women to marry, and particularly to marry at an early age. The total first
marriage rate of women (TFMR), till 1990 by far highest among European
regions (Figure 11a), has recently reached low levels typical for Western and
Northern Europe (average value for the post-communist countries was 0.52 in
1999). Widespread postponement of first marriages had a depressing effect on the
first-marriage rates, which would otherwise be considerably higher.
Regional differences in the intensity of first marriages (Figure 11b) have followed
the cultural-religious division, with the Christian Orthodox and the more
traditional Catholic countries showing less pronounced decline in the first
marriage rates. The decline was steep in the Catholic secularized countries, with
Figure 11a: Total first marriage rates (TFMR) of women in European regions,
1980-1998/99
Figure 11b: Total first marriage rates of women in Eastern European regions
1980-1998/99 (cultural-religious regions)
Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia
Orthodox countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Russia
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average values of the TFMR below 0.5 since 1996, and even more in countries
with the Protestant tradition (TFMR below 0.4 since 1996). In most countries,
postponement of first marriages has been stronger than the postponement of first
births. Non-marital births have become common especially among young women
below age 25, while older women are more likely to marry before having
children. In Estonia and Bulgaria, similarly to Scandinavian countries, the mean
age of first mothers has become lower than the age of first-marrying women (in
Estonia 23.8 vs. 24.5 years in 1999).
3.6. Increase in cohabitation or expansion of lone motherhood?
Was the spread of non-marital births associated with the diffusion of alternative
forms of family, namely with the increase in cohabitation, or was it the expansion
of lone motherhood taking place in the post-communist societies? As the data on
informal unions are not regularly collected or surveyed23, we have to rely on the
evidence provided by two large survey projects -  FFS (Fertility and Family
Survey) and RHS (Reproductive Health Survey) that have taken place at least
once in almost all post-communist countries during the 1990s 24. The major
disadvantage of combining these two sources lies in a comparison of countries at
different stages of demographic and social change. Due to the dynamic changes in
the region over the 1990s, it is very likely that the picture obtained by the
combination of evidence from different countries over a period of 9 years (1991-
1999) is distorted. However, keeping this fact in mind, it is still valuable since
these are the only extensive data sets on cohabitation as well as on contraceptive
use and life transitions in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, countries that appeared in
an extreme position at the beginning of the 1990s (e.g. Poland with virtually non-
existent cohabitation), are highly unlikely to appear on the opposite side of the
spectrum in 1999.
                                                                
23 Some social surveys as well as the data collected by the population censuses provide information
on living arrangements. Unfortunately, the census data frequently underestimate the extent of
cohabitation, as especially young people often do not report it. For instance, in the Czech Republic
many people do not want to report living in the apartment, where they are not officially registered.
24 Among 16 regions considered in the paper, only in Croatia, Belarus and in the Slovakia neither
FFS, nor RHS has been conducted in the 1990s.
Fertility changes in European post-communist countries
30
Figure 12 compares the proportion of non-marital births with the proportion of
women living in consensual union at age 25-29 in the 1990s 25. In most post-
communist societies, relatively few women were cohabiting at that age (typically
less than 5 %), especially in the early 1990s, with highly traditional Poland (0.48
% in 1991) being an extreme case. Nevertheless, there were substantial regional
differences, with some countries showing both higher prevalence of cohabitation
and non-marital childbearing (especially Estonia in 1994 and Slovenia in 1995).
In these societies, cohabitation had been largely accepted already during the
communist era. In addition, two regions – Bulgaria in 1997 and the former GDR
Figure 12: Non-marital births (%) and proportion of women cohabiting at age 25-
29 in Eastern European countries (various years – data from the FFS and RHS
surveys)
                                                                
25 The preparation of this figure was inspired by a similar figure for European countries, compiled
by Lesthaeghe and Moors (2000, p. 157, Figure 23). The age-group 25-29 was selected because it
has recently become more important for childbearing than the 20-24 age group and cohabitation
among these women indicates stronger preference for cohabitation than among the younger ones,
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in 1992 – display relatively low prevalence of cohabitation (less than 10 %)
combined with a high proportion (over 30 %) of non-marital births. Childbearing
among single women seems to be widespread there26. Despite a large
heterogeneity, the direction of change towards increased non-marital childbearing
coupled with higher prevalence of cohabitation is clearly illustrated for the three
countries with comparable data on development over time: the Czech Republic
(1993 and 1997), Romania (1993 and 1999) and Russia (1996 and 1999). Recent
evidence, provided by the European Values Study data of 1999 suggests that the
increase in the popularity of cohabitation in the post-communist countries since
the early 1990s was spectacular. Despite the small national sample sizes, the
survey shows that in the countries of Central Europe (except of Poland and
Slovakia) and Baltic countries (except of Lithuania), cohabitation has become a
common living arrangement among young people aged 20-29 (Lesthaeghe and
Surkyn, 2002, p. 5 and Table 2).
The FFS surveys also investigated partnership status of women at first birth
(Table 15 in the Standard Country Report Tables); a distinction was made
between marriage, consensual union and no partnership. The results depict a large
variety not only in the proportion of children born within marriage, but also in the
split of non-marital births between consensual unions and single mothers (see
Figure 13 for women aged 20-24). Low status of cohabitation in two traditionally
Catholic societies, Poland and Lithuania seems to be a strong barrier to living and
having children in non-marital union and explains a small prevalence of non-
marital births, which were almost entirely taking place among single mothers.
Among countries with a large proportion of first children born outside marriage,
only in Estonia is cohabitation a typical setting for non-marital childbearing27. In
Slovenia, cohabitation was only slightly prevailing over single motherhood, while
                                                                
26 Most countries applied policies that disfavored consensual unions, such as advantageous loans or
provision of housing for the newlywed couples. The East German policy, which granted a special
status to single mothers since 1976, was an exception which created an incentive for non-marital
childbearing (Monnier 1990).
27 According to Katus et al. (2000, p. 133), cohabitation has spread steadily in Estonia since the
1960s. Among women born in the early 1970s (native women only), it accounts for more than 90 %
of first partnerships (see also FFS, 1994). While about four fifths of first births are conceived
outside registered unions, births to single mothers formed only 7 to 10 % of all births over a long
period of time. In this sense, Estonia depicted similar trends to the Scandinavian countries.
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Figure 13: Partnership status at first birth, women aged 20-24 with at least one
child (FFS data)
East Germany, where a large proportion of first births takes place outside
marriage and particularly among single women, constitutes a specific case28. As
East Germans have a very tolerant approach toward alternative living
arrangements, the proportion of single mothers is striking. The question remains
how the previous population policies influenced this pattern (see footnote 24) and
whether it is more a result of a deliberate choice of women or whether it is a
“commitment crisis” indicating the lack of male interest and support for family 29.
The diversity of Central and Eastern Europe with regard to the extent of
cohabitation is further depicted in Figure 14, showing the proportion of women
cohabiting (percentage of all women living in unions) at age 20-24 and 25-29.
Although cohabitation was not more popular than marriage in any country and at
any age group, the variety is apparent: less than 5 % of women living in union at
age 20-24 or 25-29 cohabited in Poland in 1991, in Lithuania in 1994-95 and
                                                                
28 Among women aged 20-24 and having at least one child in 1992, only 39.6 % had first child
within marriage, while 37.6 % were single and 22.8 % were cohabiting. Among 25-29 years old
women, one third had first child when they were living without partner.
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Figure 14: Share of cohabitation on the total number of unions (%) among
women aged 20-24 and 25-29, various surveys (FFS and RHS)
in Moldova in 1997. On the other hand, cohabitation was common in the former
GDR, in Slovenia, in Russia and in Estonia. Higher prevalence of cohabitation
among young women aged 20-24 is a result of two trends. Cohabitation among
younger women often serves as a short period of living together before marriage
(“trial marriage”). At the same time, younger generations have relaxed attitudes
toward traditional living arrangements and for each new cohort, cohabitation is
increasingly acceptable and more frequently experienced living arrangement.  
3.7. Fewer abortions, better contraception: a stealthy contraceptive
revolution
Till the late 1980s, reproductive behavior of women in Eastern Europe was
characterized by a limited choice of modern contraception, lack of sex education,
and generally irresponsible approach towards family planning coupled with a high
prevalence of induced abortion, in most countries provided on request for free
since the second half of the 1950s 30 (see Frejka, 1983; Blayo, 1991 and Stloukal,
                                                                
30 In some countries, access to abortion was later limited or abortion policy was changing over time
as a part of the pronatalist measures. Romania, enforcing the ban on abortion for most women since
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1996). As most societies were quite tolerant to pre-marital and non-marital sex,
women experienced first sex relatively early and usually before marriage31.
Nevertheless, first sex occurred mostly without the use of any contraceptive
method and first pregnancy often followed soon after the onset of reproductive
life. Since women pregnant for the first time usually did not opt for an abortion,
marriage – commonly entered by a pregnant bride – and birth soon followed.
Abortion was widespread among women with two or more children. Generally
low control of people over their reproduction resulted in a high proportion of
“mistimed” or even “unwanted” births. The important question to investigate is
whether the post-communist countries experienced the “contraceptive revolution”
and the move toward the ideal of the “perfect contraceptive society” during the
1990s. In other words, has the specific “abortion culture” of Eastern Europe
disappeared?
Besides the special case of Poland, where a strict anti-abortion law was
established in 199332; available statistics for other countries indicate a significant
decline in the total induced abortion rates (TIAR) over the 1990s33 (Table 3). The
1990s thus were the period of simultaneous strong decline in birth and abortion
rates, contrasting with the previous “mirror effect” between induced abortion and
fertility, typical for Eastern Europe. Although the decline in abortion rates was
registered in all post-communist countries, there was a lasting division between
countries with fairly low abortion rates and countries, where the incidence of
induced abortion still remained high at the end of the 1990s. All Central European
countries and Lithuania belong to the first group, with TIAR below 1.0. Values of
TIAR around 0.5 registered in 1999 in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and in the
Slovak Republic, are close to the abortion rates of many Western European
countries such as France and Sweden. Other countries with available data had the
                                                                
31 According to the FFS surveys, among women born in the second half of the 1960s, median age at
first sex varied between 17.6 years in the Czech Republic (birth cohorts 1968-72) and 20.1 years in
Lithuania (birth cohort 1965-75). In several countries (Moldova, Romania), first sex often took
place within marriage, but in most countries, first sex was typically non-marital, For instance, in the
Czech Republic only 0.4 % of sexually experienced women reported they had first sex after
marriage. (RHS, 1993).
32 For a valuable analysis of the previous abortion debate, see Kulczycki (1995); for more recent
development, see FEDERA (2000).
33 Part of the recorded decline in abortion rates may be due to the incomplete registration of
abortions in the 1990s in some countries.
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Table 3: Estimates of the total induced abortion rate, 1985-1999
Notes: Most data based on statistics of legal induced abortions and age structure of women by 5-year age
groups. Estimates for Latvia until 1998, Lithuania, Moldova and Russia are based on data for age groups
10-14, 15-19, 20-34 and 35-49 only. Some data (e.g. for the Post-Soviet Republics) may be incomplete
due to underregistration.
1) Abortions illegal (with few exceptions) since 1993
2) Till 1989 legal abortions only. Author's estimate of the TIAR for all induced abortions (including
illegal abortions) in 1989 is 5.4
Sources: EUROSTAT (2001, 2002), UN (1997, 1998, 2000, 2001), Avdeev et al. (1995), Blayo (1991),
Council of Europe (1996), CNPS (1998), CR POPIN (2001), DASS (1999), Infostat (2000), SORS
(2000), Stloukal (1996)
level of the TIAR between 1.0 and 2.0 around 1999. A spectacular decline of
abortion rates occurred in Romania between 1990 (TIAR 6.0) and 1998 (TIAR
1.6). Extremely high level of abortion rates in 1990 was a reaction to the
legalization of abortion in December 1989 under the conditions of still very
limited access to and information about contraceptive means.
1985 1989 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Central-Eastern Europe
Croatia .. .. .. .. .. 0.30 .. 0.25
Czech Republic 1.13 1.50 1.51 0.67 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.53
Hungary 1.09 .. 1.22 1.06 1.06 1.03 0.96 0.92
Poland 1) .. .. 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovak Republic 0.92 1.23 1.23 0.75 0.62 0.55 0.52 0.47
Slovenia 1.19 1.04 0.96 0.72 0.68 0.65 0.62 0.59
Former GDR 0.74 0.63 0.57 .. .. .. ..
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 1.78 2.25 2.37 1.69 1.71 .. 1.52 1.25
Romania 2) 1.92 1.19 6.07 3.04 2.74 2.07 1.61 1.53
Baltic Republics 
Estonia .. 2.17 .. 1.70 1.63 1.62 1.53 1.46
Latvia .. 2.21 .. .. 1.28 1.16 1.09 1.07
Lithuania .. 1.68 .. 1.14 1.02 0.83 0.78 0.70
Post-soviet republics 
Belarus .. 3.06 .. .. .. 2.04 ..
Moldova 2.72 2.67 2.20 1.55 1.22 .. 1.17
Russia 3.66 3.31 3.05 2.14 .. .. ..
Ukraine .. 2.65 .. .. .. .. ..
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Table 4 presents the distribution of contraceptive use among women living in
union aged 25-29 according to various RHS and FFS surveys34. The proportion of
women reporting current use of any contraceptive method varied between 52
(Poland) and 76 percent (Hungary). Bulgaria with a very low level of the use of
any method, reported only by 42 % of women in union aged 25-29, and yet not
extremely high abortion rates is a notable exception.
The heterogeneity in the patterns of contraceptive use in Eastern Europe is
manifested in two ways. Some countries display a persistent popularity of
traditional contraceptive methods  – coitus interruptus and periodic abstinence –
which were still used by 30 to 50 % of women in Ukraine (1999), Romania (1993
Table 4: Contraceptive use among women in union aged 25-29, FFS and RHS
surveys
1) The pill, condoms, the IUD, injections, diaphragm, sterilization
2) Periodic abstinence and withdrawal
3) Due to the use of multiple methods, the sum of the respondents using modern and traditional
methods may be higher than the total number of contraceptive users
4) No contraceptive use among fecund, not pregnant and sexually active women
5)     Total number of women not using contraception, including pregnant and infecund women.
6)     Including unknown cases
7) Including 19 % of women reported as sexually inactive, this figure probably includes unknown
cases.
                                                                
34 The figures are not adjusted for the non-response rate, which was quite high in some countries
(e.g. in Poland, see Table 4).
Pill Condom IUD Modern 1) Traditional 2) Total  3) No met. 4) No met.  5) Unknown
Czech Republic 1993 12.5 19.8 15.3 49.6 22.4 72.0 . 27.2 0.8
Czech Republic 1997 26.7 18.4 7.4 56.8 9.3 61.8 . 19.8 18.4
Hungary, 1992-93 50.3 6.4 12.3 71.3 6.0 75.6 8.9 21.5 2.9
Poland 1991 3.6 11.0 6.6 23.7 32.2 52.2 6.3 20.5 27.3
Slovenia 1995 29.7 9.8 16.5 57.3 13.5 71.4 9.6 21.9 6.7
Former GDR 1992 64.4 0.0 3.9 71.1 3.3 72.0 20.6  6) 28.0 .
Bulgaria 1997-98 9.4 11.4 3.4 25.1 17.1 42.0 37.8 48.6 9.4
Romania 1993 4.0 5.5 6.3 17.5 48.4 65.9 . 34.1 .
Romania 1999 (age 25-34) 11.9 10.5 8.0 35.6 33.5 70.1 . 29.9 .
Estonia 1994 (native women) 5.8 17.7 31.5 55.9 21.4 63.9 12.2 36.1  7) 0.0
Latvia 1995 11.2 15.4 23.8 50.8 8.1 58.8 10.0 24.7 16.5
Lithuania 1994-95 4.4 15.6 17.8 38.9 18.0 56.7 19.4 34.4 8.9
Moldova 1997 (age 25-34) 3.0 6.5 41.6 54.0 21.8 75.9 . 24.1 .
Russia 1996 (avg. 3 regions) 7.5 30.3 12.3 55.0 16.8 71.8 . 28.2 .
Russia 1999 (avg. 3 regions) 7.4 25.1 15.6 53.3 19.5 72.8 . 27.2 .
Ukraine 1999 3.3 16.0 19.3 42.0 29.7 71.6 . 28.4 .
Fertility changes in European post-communist countries
37
and 1999) and in Poland (1991). In these countries, as well as in Lithuania (1994-
95) and Bulgaria (1997-98) the use of modern contraception (condoms, the pill or
the IUD) was lower than 40%. Only in Central Europe (with a notable exception
of Poland), traditional methods are currently used by a small minority of women.
Another differentiation was in respect to the usually used contraceptive means.
The pill has become the main method of contraception among younger women in
Central Europe (again with the exception of Poland in 1991), while in the Baltic
countries and in the Post-Soviet Republics, the proportion of women using the
intrauterine device (IUD) by far outnumbers a small number of women using the
pill35.
The time trends, provided by data for the Czech Republic (1993 and 1997) and
Romania (1993 and 1999) depict an increasing popularity of the pill, which is
replacing the IUD and the traditional methods of contraception36. These trends are
common across the whole Eastern Europe, but they are evidently taking place at a
very different pace.
3.8. Declining fertility and abortion rates among teenage women
Till the early 1990s, a large proportion of women in Eastern Europe gave birth to
a child before reaching age 2037. The evidence on changes in fertility and abortion
rates among adolescent women during the 1990s may serve as a starting point for
                                                                
35 The 1992 FFS data for East Germany seem to indicate that the former GDR had unique
contraceptive patterns as compared with other post-communist countries, namely very high
proportion of women using the pill and almost non-existent use of the traditional methods. However,
since the reported use of condoms and the IUD is also extremely small and this pattern holds for all
age groups of women, one may wonder whether these data mirror absolutely dominant position of
the pill as a contraceptive method of choice in East Germany or whether this finding is an artefact
caused by incompleteness or the low reliability of the survey.
36 A comparison of the RHS surveys conducted in three regions of the Russian Federation in 1996
and 1999 does not reveal substantial changes in the patterns of contraceptive use. The economic
crisis of August 1998 might have slowed down the spread of modern contraception, which has
become unaffordable for many people.
37 According to the age- and parity-specific fertility rates at the end of the 1980s, the proportion of
women having at least one child before the age 20 varied between 14 % (Poland 14.4 % in 1990,
Lithuania 16.7 % in 1989) and 29 % (Bulgaria in 1987, Moldova in 1990).
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further discussion on the background of fertility changes. The behavior of the
youngest group of women is most sensitive to broad social and economic
changes. They are likely to be flexible in realizing or not realizing their fertility
intentions early in life, to be less strict in following previous behavioral norms, to
take largest advantage of new opportunities offered by democratic society
(especially of prolonged education) and unlike their parents, to use effective
contraception from the onset of their sexual activity, provided that it is affordable
and easily accessible. Kosunen and Rimpelä (1996; quoted in Karro 1997, p. 12)
proposed that increasing use of contraceptives first affects the fertility rates of
teenagers and later the abortion rates.
Figure 15 illustrates mutual changes in fertility and abortion rates among women
aged 15-19 in eight countries between 1989 and 2000. Apart from the changes in
fertility and abortion rates, the “trade-off” between these two – prevailing
Figure 15: Pregnancies of teenage women: Changes in fertility and abortion rates
among women below age 20 between 1989 and 2000 (rates per thousand women
aged 15-19)
Sources: EUROSTAT (2001, 2002), Council of Europe (1996 and 2001), Blayo (1991), CR POPIN
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preferences either for birth or for abortion among pregnant women –may be
established. Over this period, young women in all countries have experienced
both lower abortion and birth rates, with most of them showing a more intensive
decrease in the birth rates (Romania is an exception of a more intensive decline in
abortion rates). Low abortion and fertility rates in Central Europe, especially in
the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, indicate a move towards the
low willingness of adolescent women to have children, typical for Western
European societies, as well as the widespread contraceptive use. Other countries,
particularly Bulgaria and Moldova, still display high rate of pregnancies among
teenage women.
Despite increasing preference for abortion among pregnant teenagers, fertility
rates among teenage women in most countries remain higher than abortion rates
and the regional contrasts have increased. While in Slovenia about 20 per 1000
teenage women got pregnant in 1998 and 60 % of them opted for an abortion, in
Moldova about 70 per 1000 teenage women got pregnant and only a quarter of
them opted for an abortion.
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4. NEW CONSTRAINTS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES : FERTILITY
CHANGE IN A BROADER PERSPECTIVE
4.1. The concept of the “socialist greenhouse” environment
To interpret the increasing diversity in fertility development in Central and
Eastern Europe, the scheme of the “socialist greenhouse”, an artificial
environment typical for the state socialist societies of Eastern Europe till the end
of the 1980s, is developed. The notion of the socialist greenhouse explains why
Central and Eastern Europe remained relatively unaffected by the substantial
changes in fertility in Western European societies in the 1970s and 1980s. The
rapid breakdown of this environment that took place over the 1990s had a
profound effect on fertility and reproductive behavior of the people living in
Eastern Europe.
The scheme of the socialist greenhouse in Figure 16 presents a relationship
between the life domains of education, career and family, where the family
domain  is further divided into the domain of private life and family and the
domain of reproduction38. Separately, the effects of social and population policies
are considered. Thin lines are drawn between the domains, where weaker causal
relationship could be found, thick lines point out the more important relationships.
While the participation in education influenced the family domain, most people
completed their education early in life and therefore education usually had not
affected their adult lives. The effects of educational level on the career were
weak, as other principles –e.g. membership in the Communist party – were more
decisive for the job position. The system, in which manual workers were often
paid better than a university professor generated “a depreciation of the intristic
value of broad education as a requirement for leadership” (Macek et al., 1998, p.
551). The career did not have much influence on the family life and on
reproductive decisions. Due to the small differences in income, low pressure for
flexibility, non-existing unemployment coupled with a permanent shortage of
                                                                
38 This is not to separate reproduction from the family life; this distinction is made to discuss
specific factors that facilitated changes in reproductive behavior.
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Figure 16: Scheme of the socialist greenhouse environment
workforce39 and generally low-demanding environment, most women (childcare
was – and mostly still remains – dominantly a women’s task) had resources and
time to care about their children.
State population policy and overarching social security were, on the other hand,
important in shaping the decisions of people. The system of extensive and
egalitarian social care, accompanying people from the cradle to the grave kept the
opportunities for young people limited and the price of having children low.
Childcare provided by a dense network of crèches, kindergartens and elementary
schools was cheap and subsidized, with subsidies including meals and textbooks.
Moreover, in many countries women were granted a paid period of maternity
leave and families obtained child benefits, which were often progressively
increasing with the number of children. The functioning of the socialist
greenhouse with regard to the specific life domains is briefly described in Table
                                                                
39 Carlson (1992) argued that Easterlin’s (1968) theory linking the difficulties of large cohorts on the
labor market with their successive relative deprivation resulting in lower fertility worked in the
opposite direction in Eastern Europe. Large cohorts helped to reduce the shortage of labor and
therefore stimulated better performance of economy, which contributed to the temporary increase in
the period TFR.
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AP-1 in Appendix. Here, I discuss several distinctive features that characterized
previous patterns of reproduction during the 1970s and 1980s.
Quantity matters: A system of extensive reproduction
The socialist greenhouse was a system of extensive reproduction, where women
experienced on average more pregnancies than in other European regions.
Slightly higher fertility rates and considerably higher abortion rates40 may be
judged from a broader perspective of the functioning of communist societies,
which were developed on the principle of extensive economic growth41, but were
unable to provide high quality or a variety of products. In the domain of human
reproduction, the quantity orientation was manifested by the less intensive health
care (due to the lack of money and modern technology), by the inability to
provide a large choice of comfortable and easily accessible contraception and by
the pronatalist orientation often connected with chronic shortages of the labor
force. Zakharov (2000, p. 295) pointed out that in the former Soviet Union “the
totalitarian State regarded particular growth of human resources, particularly in
labor force, as a specific means to escape economic problems as well as a source
of continued expansion of military and geopolitical power”.
                                                                
40 Among women born in 1960, the completed cohort fertility is typically around 2.0 children per
woman (e.g. in the Czech Republic – 2.02, Hungary – 2.02 or Estonia – 1.99), with the lowest level
in the former GDR (1.78) and highest in Moldova, Poland (2.18), Slovak Republic (2.17) and
Romania (2.16 – data from Council of Europe, 2000). This is slightly above the typical level for
Western, Southern and Northern Europe, which is around 1.8. However, Eastern European women
born around 1960 experienced much higher abortion rates than their Western European counterparts
and the total number of pregnancies over their reproductive life was thus over 3 in most countries of
Eastern Europe.
41 The perception of economic success was not based on the principles of income, profit or GDP
growth. Economic success was linked to the extensive development, measured in terms of tons of
coal and limestone mined, tons of steel and iron produced, and thousands apartments built. The
overall emphasis on quantity meant that the quality (and often the real demand) was disregarded.
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Uniformity and egalitarianism
Bureaucratic socialism was a highly egalitarian and uniform system that
supported conformity among the citizens42. Obedience, passivity and hypocrisy
were rewarded and often were part of successful life strategies, while distinctness
and own initiative were considered to be troublesome. Opportunities were limited,
space for alternative lifestyles even more. The state established a strong control
over society. Citizens were subjected to a highly centralized system of
bureaucratic planning, regulations and top-down decisions. As a result, a
relatively high degree of personal security was characteristic for these societies,
leading some researchers to put forward views of the functioning of communist
societies as a “trade-off” between freedom and security:
“Under the rule of patronage state, freedom of individual choice in all its
dimensions was to be permanently and severely curtailed, yet in exchange the less
prepossessing aspects of freedom – like individual responsibility for personal
survival, success and failure – were to be spared” (Bauman, 1992, p. 163).
Most people followed the same, relatively uniform, pathway of life transitions
marked by completed education, first job, marriage connected with the move to
own apartment and subsequent childbearing. Only high prevalence of divorce in
many countries and relatively high mortality of middle-aged men made living
arrangements of people over age 35 more differentiated.
Familism and sexual puritanism
Though the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 seemed initially to bring about
free love and a prospect for the gradual disappearance of traditional family as a
typical bourgeois institution (see Geiger, 1968), sexual puritanism and support for
                                                                
42 In the article published at the 10th anniversary of the demise of communist regimes in Eastern
Europe (The Economist, 6th  November 1999, p. 21), the uniformity of communist societies is
described in an interesting though little exaggerated way: “from Budapest to Warsaw across ten time
zones to Vladivostok, the same monolithic monster prevailed, the same brutal phoney triumphalism,
the same glowering statue of Lenin on his pedestal in thousand upon thousand town squares (…) the
greyness (…) the hostility to religion; the tyranny of one ideology, the totalitarian control of a single
party in the grip of a privileged few”
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traditional families were characteristic for the final decades of Eastern European
authoritative regimes. Lack of information regarding sex and contraception, lack
of sex education and shying about words “sex” and “sexual” created an
environment, in which “ignorance regarding sex and reproduction was widespread
among lay people and, paradoxically even among media workers” (Stloukal,
1996, p. 8). Official Communist morality pursued the idea of parental “duty” or
responsibility of women to society to bear children. The position of women was
often characterized by inconsistent combination of egalitarian ideology, quasi-
egalitarian practice and traditional stereotypes (Zdravomyslova and Temkina,
1997, quoted in Zhurzhenko, 2001, p. 37). Official support for families, leading
even to the “idolization of family”, developed in some instances to a “morality”
similar to the most orthodox Catholic morality (Ferge, 1997, p. 164).
The function of family
Despite widespread secularization and tolerant attitudes toward abortion, divorce
and non-marital sex, caring about family and children or “happy family life” were
one of the most strongly emphasized life goals among people in Central and
Eastern Europe. Very few women, typically less than 10 %, remained never
married. Family life had different functions and was fulfilling different needs than
in Western societies. In a system of bureaucratic housing distribution, starting a
family was for young people the easiest option to obtain an apartment and leave
the parental home; paradoxically marriage and childbearing formed the early road
to independence (van de Kaa, 1993) 43. State subsidies in the form of loans for the
newlyweds, youth saving schemes and family allowances further strengthened the
attractiveness of marriage, suggesting that the only possible obstacle to family life
– money – is easily solved (Rabušic, 1990). Moreover, family provided space for
individual fulfillment and self-realization. Many people lived a dual life, with a
sharp divide between public and private behavior and morality (Macek et al.,
1998, p. 550). It was only within the small circle of family and friends that people
felt free to talk and express themselves openly. Family ties and mutual help of
family members were also important for providing informal services and
                                                                
43 The situation in Russia was described by Avdeev and Monnier (1995, p. 7) in the following way:
“housing shortage paradoxically resulted in earlier marriage and parenthood: it was necessary to
waste no time in starting a family, to stand a chance of having one’s own home by the age of 30”.
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substituting thus the underdeveloped service economy. Widespread familistic
behavior in Eastern Europe can be seen as a specific reaction to the outside
environment, an “escape into the family”.
4.2. Dissolution of the socialist greenhouse: Why so fast?
The scheme of the dissolution of the socialist greenhouse (Figure 17 and Table
AP-2) considers separately the influence of two broad groups of factors, economic
constraints and social change. Economic constraints refer to the economic crisis,
declining or insufficient support provided by the social security network,
deteriorating position of families with children as well as formerly inexperienced
phenomena of unemployment, sharp income disparities and poverty. Social
change is an extensive category pertaining to recent social and cultural changes,
including “Westernization”, new opportunities, influences of market economy,
changes in values and attitudes and changes in the organization of labor.
Although the terminology distinguishing social change from economic factors
frequently differs, the influence of these two broad categories is often discussed in
the papers analyzing recent fertility changes in European post-communist
countries. There is no common agreement among demographers how important
was the influence of each of these two factors on women’s reproductive decisions.
There is also a discussion on the causality and the direction of changes induced by
either economic constraints or by social change and on the regional
differentiation of the influences of these two factors. With some simplification,
social change is expected to bring about a broad transformation of demographic
behavior comparable with earlier changes in Western Europe, while the economic
constraints are often thought to depress fertility levels but to preserve the
distinctiveness of previous fertility patterns.
In Figure 17, social change affects directly the domains of career, education and
private and family life, while it further affects the domain of reproduction through
the dissemination of modern contraception. Economic constraints affect
especially social security and population policy and the domain of career. In turn,
social policy affects the family domain . Some relationships, which were weak in
the socialist greenhouse, gain in importance. Educational level is increasingly
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Figure 17: The dissolution of the socialist greenhouse
important for the domain of career, especially for employment prospects, career
position and salary. The effects of “being in education”, strong in the socialist
greenhouse, are more important due to an increasing proportion of young people
involved in secondary, post-secondary and especially university education. The
career has a growing impact on the private life, family and reproductive decisions.
Thread of unemployment combined with the pressure for higher efficiency,
flexibility and work commitment interfere with the childbearing plans, family life
and leisure activities. Social change has an independent effect on private and
family life: new opportunities and the diffusion of “Western” lifestyles decrease
the attractiveness of traditional pathways marked by the early and almost
universal transitions to marriage and childbearing. Economic constraints, more
specifically the move toward market economy and governments’ inability to
finance extensive social policies, further affect family life and reproductive
decisions. State system of housing distribution is abandoned, support for families
with children reduced or income-tested. Establishing a family may be both
Fertility changes in European post-communist countries
48
economically disadvantageous and socially unattractive 44, having children may be
expensive (most subsidies abandoned), time-consuming (increasing opportunity
costs) and even undesirable due to the competing new opportunities and value
change towards individual lifestyles.
A rapid dissolution of the socialist greenhouse may be linked to the similarly
rapid collapse of the totalitarian political systems. Social change associated with
new opportunities, consumer choice and “unaccustomed freedom” (Scheich et al.,
2000, p. 141) as well as with the new constraints started to affect people almost
immediately. Sudden decline in period fertility was a result of a simultaneous
influence of social change and economic constraints. Moreover, there were latent
conditions favorable for rapid fertility changes present in many state-socialist
countries before 1989, namely high secularization, rational and pragmatic
orientation and quite positive attitudes toward non-marital births or cohabitation.
These conditions further speeded-up fertility transformation over the 1990s.
4.3. Economic constraints
The scheme of the dissolution of the socialist greenhouse distinguished the
influences of social change and economic constraints on various life domains.
Which factors were most important in inducing fertility changes? To prevent an
extensive discussion on a long “shopping list” of all relevant factors (see also
Table AP-2), the paper focuses selectively on the most important ones.
Many demographers emphasized the influence of economic factors in Eastern
European fertility changes45. A paper published by the United Nations (UN ECE,
                                                                
44 As the social policies do not provide incentives for establishing a family (through housing
distribution, special loans or taxes), their influence on private and family life – strong in the era of
the socialist greenhouse – is assumed to be weak.
45 Ellman (2000) provides a detailed overview of the “social costs of transformation” in Eastern
Europe. Apart from the factors discussed here, he pays attention to the deterioration or collapse of
public services in many (especially the Post-soviet) countries, to the growth of corruption and crime
and particularly to the spread of poverty and income disparities. Moreover, various groups of
population were unequally affected by these negative phenomena. A comprehensive account on the
changing lives of women was published by UNICEF (1999).
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2000 (1)) stressed the spread of poverty, decline in living standards of families
and generally “the social and economic crisis of the 1990s”, which “was a major
driving force behind the fertility decline” (p. 190). Authors referring to the
situation in individual countries often argued in a similar way. Rychtaríková
(2000, p. 101) concluded that in the Czech Republic, “all symptoms seem to
indicate crisis behavior more than intentional choice” and emphasized family
income deterioration, rising criminality and corruption and “increased general
feeling of insecurity and distress”. Economic deterioration and broad social crisis
are most often stressed in connection with the situation in the Post-Soviet
Republics. Steshenko (2000, p. 355), commenting on the social tension and
widespread feeling of hopelessness in Ukraine, proposed that “desire to be parent
and to have children in a current crisis situation competes with the need of
survival”.
Economic crisis
Which countries have faced severe economic crisis and which have undergone
relatively smooth transition toward market economy? How to assess the
importance of economic deprivation people face in different countries? Figure 18
shows the position of different countries with respect to the absolute level of GDP
in 1998 (US Dollars in purchasing power parity) and real GDP change between
1989 and 1999.
The differences between countries are striking. Most countries with low GDP
level in 1998 had previously experienced strong economic decline, while
countries with relatively high GDP in 1998 had experienced a modest decline or
even some economic growth during the previous decade. The figure helps to
distinguish countries that have seen a relatively smooth transition to market
economy; especially Central European countries (except Croatia) had fairly high
GDP level and experienced either economic growth or only a minor decline over
the 1989-1999 period. Moldova and Ukraine, trapped in a severe economic crisis
marked by a dramatic and longstanding decline in the GDP, contrast with these
relatively successful countries. Other countries occupy an intermediate position;
however most of them have seen quite a steady economic decline. This picture
provides only a basic orientation in the economic landscape of the post-
communist countries. However, decline in the human development index,
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Figure 18: GDP in purchasing power parity in US Dollars in 1998 and real GDP
change 1989-98
Sources: UN HDR (2000), UN ECE (2000(2))
inflation rate, degree of poverty and the expenditures spent on food are closely
related with the intensity of economic deterioration between 1989 and 1999 (see
Table AP-4). Similarly, Inglehart and Baker (2000, p. 41) distinguish between
countries that experienced economic and societal collapse and countries that made
a successful transition to market economy. All the Post-Soviet states belong to the
first category, characterized by an increasing emphasis on survival values,
“growing misery, distrust, rejection of outgroups, xenophobia and authoritative
nationalism”. It is plausible that in the countries that faced profound economic
crisis coupled with the collapse of previous social and economic structures,
fertility change was dominantly influenced by the economic constraints.
To what degree have the new economic constraints affected the more successful
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for the families with children, two broad factors are important: relative
deprivation and work-related issues.
Relative deprivation, uncertainty and risk aversion
Several researchers have proposed that in Eastern Europe not so much the real
deprivation but relative deprivation related either to the Western living standards
and consumer aspirations (Lesthaeghe, 2000, p. 10) or to the evaluation of own
income and personal expectations (Philipov, 2002, p. 12) was more important for
fertility decisions. Furthermore, the profound and dramatic societal changes lead
to the widespread feelings of uncertainty and “fear of the future”. People facing
an uncertain future may postpone or forego major life commitments associated
with future costs and benefits that are uncertain46. However, as the low level of
economic development at the end of the 1990s corresponds with the intensive
decline in GDP and living standards over the previous decade, the relative
deprivation should be stronger in countries which have seen an upsurge of poverty
and income disparities. Similarly, the effects of discontinuity, disorderliness and
above all uncertainty and fear of the future47 have played a more important role in
societies experiencing deep crisis.
                                                                
46 McDonald (2001, p. 5) refers to the “risk theory” and emphasizes that the decision to have a child
is a decision to change the future life course and it depends upon the future orientation of the people
making decisions: “If there is a perception that economic, social, intimate or personal futures are
uncertain, decision makers may err on the side of safety in order to avert risk or they may pursue an
opportunity that is within their reach”. A different perspective is taken by the “theory of the value of
children” proposed by Friedman et al. (1994).  In their view, marriage and childbearing are “global
strategies” available to reduce uncertainty regarding future, pursued especially among women,
whose “alternative pathways for reducing uncertainty are limited or blocked” (p. 383).  Thus, we
could expect an increase in childbearing and marriage rates among women, whose living conditions
have considerably deteriorated. Generally, the evidence does not provide support for this reasoning.
Although this theory may shed some light on current differences in fertility among teenage women
(higher in economically less successful countries), these are more likely results of a slower change
in previous fertility patterns than of the uncertainty reduction strategies.
47 For an interesting discussion on discontinuity, disorderliness, social anomie and uncertainty, see
Philipov (2002, p. 15-19).
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Employment, unemployment and gender issues
Access to employment and easy combination of career and childcare is one of the
critical issues for the future fertility development in the region. During the
communist era most women, typically over 90 % in the productive age,
participated in the labor force. Since the inefficient economy was facing a
permanent shortage of available labor force, employment of women was officially
promoted. In addition, salaries were low and most women had to work in order to
ensure basic living standards of their families. Some women perceived this
situation as a “double slavery” of the traditional role of wife and mother and a
new role of the member of labor force (e.g. Panova et al. 1993, p. 17).
Although most countries experienced considerably steeper decline in the labor
force participation among women than among men over the 1990s (UN EE 2000
(1), p. 196), women still accounted for 43-49 % of the labor force in 1998 (Table
AP-5)). While some women may prefer to stay outside the labor market48, large
majority will pursue their labor participation to experience self-realization, to
make use of their education and above all to support themselves financially. It is
highly unlikely that once women gained economic autonomy (and hence also
increased personal freedom) by the participation in the paid labor, many of them
would seek to become housewives.
High unemployment rates and poor employment prospects, pronounced among
young and less educated people, have impact on the decisions concerning long-
term commitments. At the end of the 1990s, high unemployment was registered in
some Central European countries (unemployment rate exceeding 15 % was
recorded in Croatia, Slovak Republic and former GDR) and in Bulgaria. In the
Post-Soviet countries, unemployment is frequently hidden; many people are
officially employed or on a “temporary leave” in bankrupt firms without
obtaining a salary49. In most countries with available data, unemployment rates of
                                                                
48 Stankuniene (2000, p. 211) proposed that in Lithuania, “a new social group of housewives, that
did not and could not exist in the Soviet period of full employment, is being formed”.
49 According to the ILO enterprise survey of Ukrainian industry (1999), quoted by Nesporova (2000,
p. 143), over 20 % of workers were on short-time work and 18 % on administrative leave. Women
were forced to take extended maternity leave: “As a result, at any time, about one third of all
employees were actually laid-off although formally employed”.
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women do not considerably exceed unemployment rates of men50. Unemployment
among young people (15 to 24) reached highest proportions, over 25 % in
Bulgaria (36 %), Croatia and Latvia.
Although the weaker position of women on the labor market is not mirrored by
the data on unemployment rates, there are still many threats for the employment
prospects of women. Traditionally, women get lower salary than men, even if
they have the same level of education and comparable professional position (see
Table AP-5 for gender pay ratios). These disparities may lead to the “feminization
of poverty” with a more than proportional share of women living below the
poverty level (UN EE, 1999, p. 194). Economic crisis shifts attention from the
political emancipation of women; gender competition on the labor market
disfavors female applicants and reduces their promotion chances (Lesthaeghe,
1995, p. 52). Economic recovery may later result in a reduction in male
unemployment with female unemployment remaining high (UN EE, 1999). The
position of women with young children is especially fragile 51.
Reconciliation of work and motherhood is difficult in all “transitional societies”.
Since the private firms emphasize flexibility, reliability and work commitment, a
possibility of future pregnancy complicates the labor prospects of young childless
women. The legal protection of women against labor discrimination is weak,
opportunities for part-time work are scarce and insufficient. This situation is
sharpened in traditional societies that underwent serious economic crisis.
Zhurzhenko (2001, p. 35) found marginalization of the position of women to be
one of the most obvious consequences of the market transition in Ukraine.
                                                                
50 In 1998, relatively higher unemployment rate of women (by at least 10 % higher than the
unemployment rate of men) was in Croatia (+10 %), in Poland (+16 %) and in the Czech Republic
(+26 %). In Hungary and Estonia, unemployment of women was by 10 % lower than that of men.
51 There are not many data available on unemployment rates among women with children. Labor
market conditions seem to be tough for mothers with young children in East Germany: In April
1998, 27.3 % married women and 38.9 % single mothers with children aged 3 to 6 years were
unemployed (Grünheid and Roloff, 2000 , p. 87).
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4.4. Social change
Simultaneous changes in fertility level, timing and “setting” (marriage vs.
cohabitation vs. single motherhood) accompanied by the changes in reproductive
behavior suggest that the influence of social and cultural changes on fertility
behavior was at least equally important to the economic constraints. Ron
Lesthaeghe’s comment (1983) on fertility changes in Western Europe quoted in
Introduction is fully valid in case of Eastern European societies: fertility and
family changes have the appearance of a fundamental transition there. Most
trends, such as increase in the proportion of non-marital births, postponement of
childbearing, increase in childlessness, spread of cohabitation or
destandardization of the life course are characteristic features of the “second
demographic transition” (see Lesthaeghe, 1995 and van de Kaa, 1993). Many
authors stress the prominent importance of social changes for recent fertility
transition. Rabušic (1997, p. 114) considers “creation of democratic space for
freedom of individual choice and lifestyle” to be the most important factor of
recent demographic changes in the Czech Republic. Philipov (2002, p. 11)
suggests that the reasoning connecting fertility decline with economic hardship
has received surprisingly little scientific support. Even in the case of countries
facing severe economic crisis, there is an evidence of a broad social
transformation. Zakharov (2000, p. 308) refuses the notion of “fertility crisis” in
Russia. In his view, only “the crisis in the previous timing pattern is of real
sense”.  Philipov (2000, p. 71) observed that in Bulgaria, people who do not
experience economic difficulties also postpone marriage and births. Furthermore,
in the countries where economic recovery has started, period fertility has
continued to decline (UN ECE, 1999, p. 191) 52. From a large number of factors
influencing women’s decisions, I pay attention to the educational expansion, to
the broader influence of consumer society characterized by choice and
opportunities and to the impact of delayed expansion of modern contraception.
                                                                
52 Schmid (1989, p. 10-11) called this situation “welfare paradox”. He proposes that “with signs of
hope people become aware of the increasing societal wealth and they try to maximize their share of
these resources by promoting their personal career. A fear of possible loss of status and
opportunities is connected with this new outlook”.
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Delayed sexual and contraceptive revolution
Though Eastern European countries are highly differentiated with respect to the
contraceptive practice, sexual behavior and sexual morality, delayed
“contraceptive revolution” as well as “sexual revolution” have taken place in most
of them over the 1990s. The decline in abortion rates occurred hand in hand with
the fall in fertility rates and a rise in the use of modern contraception. Mastery of
contraception has been replacing the old “norms” of unprotected sex followed by
an early marriage and subsequent childbearing. A rather open and liberal
approach towards sexuality paved the way to the introduction of sex education
and to the boom of news regarding contraception and sexual behavior. Media that
were careful during the communist era to discuss sex and reproduction have
competed in spreading messages on sexuality, pornography, and contraception.
Women’s journals promoting “lifestyle sex” (Hawkes, 1999), special sections in
magazines for teenagers, TV shows with well-known sexologists, easily
accessible pornography and books on Kamasutra all contributed to the rapidly
increasing knowledge and awareness about sex and contraception, particularly
among young men and women. Increasing use of contraceptives reduced the
number of unwanted pregnancies and consequently also of unplanned and
“mistimed” births. Apart from this direct contribution to the fertility decline, the
spread of modern contraception is associated with the broad behavioral changes
leading to the “second demographic transition”. According to van de Kaa (1993,
p. 113), the “mastery of contraception and the freedom of the fear of pregnancy
have had a direct impact on the norms governing sexual and reproductive
behavior and, consequently, on demographic trends”.
Expansion of higher education
Expansion of secondary grammar schools and university education is one of the
most significant effects of social changes in the 1990s. In the era of the socialist
greenhouse, between 10 and 15 % of young people were enrolled at the
university53. Apprenticeship or practical training followed by an early
employment constituted a typical choice for a large part of young people living in
                                                                
53 Data from the TransMONEE 2000 database based on the CIS official statistics (Table AP-6)
indicate that in the former USSR this proportion was higher, up to 25 %.
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the system, where, by definition, workers formed the ruling class. In 1998, the
proportion of young people studying at age 20-24 was between 16 % (Romania)
and 31 % (Poland) 54, i.e. roughly two times higher than at the end of the 1980s. In
most countries, considerably more women than men are studying at the
university55. In addition, thousands of applicants in some countries (e.g. in the
Czech Republic) are not admitted to the university due to the lack of funding,
rooms and qualified teachers.
The expansion of education influences the long-term fertility changes for several
reasons. In the first place, the status of “being in education” is not compatible
with childcare and family life. Young students usually lack time and resources
(housing and money) to have children. Start of childbearing is clearly linked to
educational attainment (Schoenmaeckers and Lodewijckx, 1999, p. 230). As a
result, an increasing proportion of women who study after age 20 may partly
account for the recent trends toward the postponement of first births.
Equally important are prevailing fertility differences by educational level. Women
with university diploma are putting more emphasis on career and non-family
interests and have on average fewer children than the less educated women. Since
the educational level has been increasingly linked to the job position, income and
career prospects, the opportunity costs of childbearing among the more educated
women are considerably higher as well. In addition, prolongation of education
and democratization of access to high education have an independent effect for
spreading values favoring individual freedom and gender equality (Lesthaeghe,
2000, p. 19). While the importance of traditional values and traditional morality
usually decreases with the level of education, high education is a strong correlate
of permissiveness in personal matters such as abortion and homosexuality,
independence, individuation, postmaterialism or sexual freedom (Lesthaeghe,
1988, p. 15 and 18). In the post-communist countries, university students and
                                                                
54 Data on the number of students by age group and sex are not available for the Post-soviet
republics. According to different data from the TransMONEE 2000 database, the enrollment in the
university education in the four post-soviet Republics has increased by about 5 % (table AP-6).
55 The female/male education participation ratio is by 40 to 50 % higher in Slovenia, Bulgaria,
Latvia and Lithuania; in total up to one third of women (Slovenia and Poland) were studying at age
20-24 (see Table AP-6).
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fresh graduates are often the pioneers of “libertarian culture” and of the new
forms of behavior, such as cohabitation or living-apart-together relationship.
Choice and opportunities: Coming of consumer society
Bauman (1992) considers the inability of communist regimes to provide consumer
choice to be one of the major reasons for their collapse56. In Western societies,
choice has become the criterion of good life and personal success: “choice of the
kind of person one would like to become, choice of pleasures one would like to
enjoy, choice of the very needs one would like to seek, adopt and gratify” (p.
169). Consumer values had spread considerably before 1990, nevertheless the
channels to satisfy them were limited (few opportunities for a significant increase
in income, small choice over a limited number of consumer goods, hardly
accessible black market, few possibilities to travel abroad) and were not
competing with the family life. In fact, consumerism was “interconnected with
“familism”, as many people evaluated their standard of living in terms of family
welfare” (Stloukal, 1996, p. 10).
Since 1990, once omnipresent posters celebrating the “achievements” of socialism
quickly gave way to billboards with images of young, nice and happy people
enjoying powerful cars, exotic holidays and new mobile phones. For many young
people, the new world of freedom and choice – to study, to switch jobs, to travel,
to consume – is still intoxicating. The old standards of behavior are disappearing
and are being replaced by individualistic lifestyles in which “people make their
own choices about marriage or cohabitation, where they are free to have children
in or outside marriage, to have them alone or with a partner, and where they can
have them early or late in life” (van de Kaa, 1999, p. 31). The meaning of sex is
transformed thanks to easily available contraception. Contraception is only
interrupted to have a “self-fulfilling conception” (van de Kaa, 1999) and bearing
and rearing children becomes just one of the possible lifestyles – an expression of
one’s chosen identity (Kuijsten, 1996, p. 122).
                                                                
56 “It is precisely choice that communism, this dictatorship over needs, could not and would not ever
provide” (p. 169)…”it was the postmodern, narcissistic culture of self-enhancement, self-enjoyment,
instant gratification and life defined in terms of consumer styles that finally exposed the
obsoleteness of the “steal per head” philosophy stubbornly preached and practised under
communism” (p. 171).
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New adoration of the consumption57 (Lesthaeghe, 1995, p. 27), achievement
ideology and a climate of competition (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1988) lead to the
postponement of childbearing as a major life commitment. Either due to the self-
centered enjoyment or due to the “quest for perfectionism” (Lesthaeghe and
Surkyn, 1988, p. 38), or due to more responsible attitudes to childbearing, “wait
and see” approach has become widespread. In embracing consumer values,
alternative lifestyles and new opportunities, young generations may not only
prove to be flexible and pragmatic under the new social conditions; they may also
distance themselves from the “boring” and uniform life histories of their parents.
Contemporary consumer culture still has a lot of space to conquer as in many
countries the “largest proportion of population is left outside the consumer
paradise” (Zhurzhenko, 2001, p. 43).
4.5. Two pathways of transition
Differences in the intensity of economic constraints and unequal diffusion of new
opportunities and social change in general contributed to the recent differentiation
in fertility development across Eastern Europe. Correlation coefficients presented
in Table 5 provide tentative evidence of the mutual interrelation between fertility,
social, economic, cultural and technological change utilizing data from diverse
sources, including the 1999 European Values Study survey (Halman, 2001).
The table presents two sets of strongly interrelated indicators referring either to
the situation in 1998-1999 or to the change over the 1990s. The first set of
indicators pertains to the postponement of childbearing in 1989-1999. The
correlation coefficients with the change in the mean age of women at childbirth
and at first birth are shown, each of them bearing a slightly different
interpretation. The delay of childbearing is best captured by the increase in the
                                                                
57 Easterlin and Crimmins (1985, p. 24) establish a direct link between the introduction of new
goods and decline in fertility: “The enjoyment of new goods tends to require life-styles other than
those centering on children, since new goods are typically substitutes for, rather than
complementary with, children. At any given level of income, households would tend to shift
expenditure toward new purposes and away from old goods, including in the latter, having and
raising children”. In all Eastern European countries, large number of consumer goods became
suddenly available since the marketization of their economies at the beginning of the 1990s.
Fertility changes in European post-communist countries
59
age of mothers having first child. Since this indicator is not available for three
regions (former GDR, Moldova and Ukraine), mean age at childbearing
represents a more complete evidence, but it is also additionally influenced by the
shifts in the parity composition of childbearing. The second set of indicators
presents correlation with fertility rates among teenage women in 1999.
The correlation table indicates that two types of fertility transition were taking
place among the post-communist countries since 1989. Change in the fertility
timing, namely the speed of the postponement of childbearing, appears to be the
major differentiating factor in the East European fertility transition. Interestingly,
the pace of the postponement is strongly connected with successful economic and
social development. Successful economic transformation (measured by the GDP
level, GDP change, inflation rate and index of economic transformation), quality
of institutions, fast technological change (captured by the improvement in the life
expectancy of men) and higher level of subjective well-being stimulated faster
departure from the previous patterns of early childbearing. This evidence is in line
with the theoretical reasoning on the impact of social and economic factors on
fertility, discussed in the preceding sections of the paper. Countries that
experienced strong break-up of the previous system of state-controlled economy
and society and a fairly smooth transition to democracy and capitalist economy
also experienced strong collapse of the previous fertility patterns and fast shift
towards the late-fertility patterns typical of countries in Western Europe. A strong
macro-level correlation of the speed of the postponement of first births with
current life satisfaction (0.84) and with the perception of freedom of choice and
control people feel over their life (0.75) is particularly interesting. It provides
support for the idea that the increasing choice and opportunities, typical of
democratic and consumer societies, contributed to the speed of transition from the
early to the late-fertility regime. Rapid postponement of births was further
connected with strong delays of marriages and intensive reduction in the first-
parity TFR due to the timing effects.
High childbearing rates among teenage women in 1999 characterize the countries
experiencing slower shifts in fertility timing and more ‘crisis-driven’ fertility
change. High fertility rates of women below age 20 in 1999 were related to the
deterioration in economy and living standards over the 1990s, low economic level
in 1998-99, decline in the life expectancy among men in 1989-1998, slow spread
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Table 5: Correlation coefficients of indicators related to the postponement of
childbearing in 1989-1999 and to fertility rates of women below age 20 in 1999
(15 countries of Central and Eastern Europe)
Mean age Mean age Fertility
at childbirth first child teenage F
1989-1999 1989-1999 1999
Economic change, living standards
% of household budget spent on food, tobacco and alcohol, 1998 -0.85*** (12) -0.72** (12) 0.82** (12)
GDP 1998 (PPP, US $) 0.84*** (15) 0.84*** (13) -0.82*** (15)
HDI 1998 0.83*** (15) 0.77** (13) -0.85*** (15)
Change in the HDI 1990-98 0.77** (15) 0.69** (13) -0.71** (15)
Index of economic transformation, 1998  1) -0.70** (15) -0.61* (13) 0.61* (15)
Real GDP change 1989-98 0.68** (15) .. -0.71** (15)
Average inflation rate, 1990-99 -0.64* (15) -0.64* (13) ..
Economic structure
% of workforce working in agriculture, 1998 -0.68** (15) .. 0.72** (15)
Institutions
Index of institutional quality, 1997-98  6) 0.79*** (15) 0.75** (13) -0.65** (15)
Technology
Change in the life expectancy of men (1989-98) 0.83*** (15) 0.81*** (13) -0.62* (14)
Internet connections, 1999 0.57* (15) .. -0.59* (15)
Spread of mobile phones, 1999 .. .. -0.59* (15)
Subjective well-being
Current life satisfaction (EVS, 1999)   2) 0.89*** (14) 0.84*** (13) -0.78*** (14)
Freedom of choice and control over one's life (EVS, 1999)   3) 0.70** (14) 0.75** (13) -0.55* (14)
Gender attitudes, traditionalism
A woman has to have children (EVS, 1999)   4) -0.65* (14) .. 0.58* (14)
Men priority getting job (EVS, 1999)  5) 0.71** (14)
Fertility and family indicators
Change in the mean age of women at first marriage, 1989-1999 0.82** (12) 0.86*** (12) ..
Fertility of women below age 20, 1999 -0.82*** (15) -0.65* (13) x
TFR1, 1998 -0.81** (11) -0.66 * (10) 0.63* (11)
Induced abortion rate, 1999 (or most recent) -0.77** (12) -0.69* (12) ..
Pearson's correlation coefficients, bivariate correlation. For lack of data, Eastern Germany was not included in the analysis.
Number of cases is indicated in parenthesis. Insignificant coefficients are not shown.
EVS - European Values Study, round 1999, HDI – Human Development Index, PPP – Purchasing power parity
Notes:   1) Higher score = less successful development (source: Karatnycky et al., 1999)
2)  "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?"
Mean country score on the 1 to 10 scale (1= dissatisfied, 10 = satisfied) 
3)  "Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel over the way
your life turns out?" Mean country score on the 1 to 10 scale (1= none at all, 10 = a grat deal)
4) Proportion of respondents who agree with the statement "Do you think that a woman has to have children 
in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?"
5) Proportion of respondents agreeing with the statement "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women"
6)  Index based on the following components: extent of democracy, government effectiveness, extent of regulation, rule of
law and extent of corruption (Source: UN ECE, 2001)
Significance: * <0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001
Sources of data: Council of Europe (2000), EUROSTAT (2001, 2002) , FV (2000), Halman (2001), Karatnycky 
et al. (1999), UN ECE (2000(2), 2001), UN HDR (2000). Sources of demographic data are listed below the Table 2.
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of modern technologies (measured by the number of Internet connections and
mobile phones) and low level of life satisfaction. People living in these countries
have to spend most of their incomes for food and a relatively large proportion of
inhabitants is employed in agriculture. Furthermore, high teenage fertility rates
are associated with the low quality of institutions and more traditional gender and
family attitudes, characterized by the view that men should get priority obtaining
job if jobs are scarce and women need children to be fulfilled (see Table 5).
High fertility rates of teenage women reveal a slower deconstruction of the
socialist greenhouse environment in countries experiencing social and economic
crisis. In these societies, fertility change was dominantly a reaction to the severe
deterioration of the living standards during the long period of economic and social
hardship and the decline in period fertility was only weakly attributed to the
postponement. Modern contraception has been only slowly reducing the high
dependence of women on abortion and many women still have children at a very
young age. New choices and opportunities are limited, and people feel little
control over their lives. While the first-parity fertility remains relatively higher,
many women opt to have only one child.
Figure 19 presents an attempt to differentiate various post-communist countries
according to the technological advancement in the 1990s. The spread of
communication technologies in 199958 is shown alongside with the change in the
life expectancy of men between 1989 and 199859. Improvements in the life
expectancy indicate a relatively stable social environment as well as technological
advancement in health care. Decline in the life expectancy points to technological
backwardness, lack of money in the health care system, a problematic social
situation and the deterioration in living standards.
Central European countries are the “winners” in the process of technological
innovation among the post-communist societies. In the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia and Slovak Republic, improvements in the life expectancy of
men as well as the diffusion of communication technologies (still small judged by
                                                                
58 Index combining number of mobile phones per 1.000 inhabitants and Internet connections per
10.000 inhabitants in 1999 (both indicators were divided by 2).
59 Decline in the life expectancy of men has been more intensive than that of women in the countries
undergoing serious economic crisis.
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Figure 19: Spread of communication technologies in 1999 and change in the life
expectancy of men in 1989-1998
Sources: Council of Europe (2000), UN ECE (2000(2)), EUROSTAT (2001)
Western European standards) took place. Four Post-Soviet republics are clustered
near the opposite side of the graph: there, modern technologies have hardly made
any inroads and life expectancy of men decreased by 1 to 4 years. Baltic states
and South-Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania) show an intermediate position,
with a slight decline of life expectancy and various levels of the spread of
communication technologies – higher in Baltic states (especially in Estonia),
lower in South-Eastern Europe. To a large degree, this differentiation closely
resembles the division of countries according to the level of GDP and GDP
change in 1989-1999 (Figure 18). Furthermore, figures charting the position of
these countries according to the quality of institutions (data in Table AP-4), life
satisfaction and people’s perception of freedom and control over their lives would
also provide similar picture.
Two contrasting pathways of fertility change outlined by the correlation analysis
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economic change and technological change (Figure 18 and 19). In the more
successful countries, particularly in Central Europe (with the exception of
Croatia), fertility change was primarily associated with the broad social changes
and was marked by an intensive postponement of first birth. In the least successful
countries, especially in the four Post-soviet republics (Belarus, Moldova, Russian
Federation, Ukraine), a deep crisis has been the major initial factor in the fertility
decline and many features of the socialist greenhouse (e.g. high abortion rates or
teenage fertility rates) are still present.
4.6. Religion, cultural tradition and value change
The above sketched picture would remain too simplistic if we would not consider
the effects of religious tradition, degree of secularization and the imprints of the
Communist mentality that form a colorful cultural mixture of Eastern Europe. Till
the 1940s, Central and Eastern Europe was culturally and economically very
heterogeneous. Four decades of shared experience with the state-bureaucratic
system, imposing the same institutions and ideology, led to the diminishing
cultural and socio-economic differences across the region. The 1990s brought the
re-emergence of diversity, manifested also in demographic trends.
In several countries, the influence of religious teachings and related behavioral
norms remains strong. The Roman Catholic Church has considerable influence in
Poland, Lithuania, in the Slovak Republic and in Croatia, while the Christian
Orthodox religion has a strong influence in Moldova, in rural parts of Ukraine and
in some regions of Romania (Moldavia, rural Transylvania). Several charts
presented in this paper suggested that religious tradition played an important role
in shaping recent fertility changes. First, it appears that more religious countries
generally faced more gradual decline in period fertility, less intensive
postponement of births, and above all, slow increase in non-marital childbearing,
slow diffusion of cohabitation and slow spread of modern contraception,
especially the pill. Countries with a strong Protestant tradition constitute a
favorable environment for the diffusion of consensual unions and non-marital
births, while Catholic secularized countries are facing rapid expansion of the pill
and an intensive postponement of first births. In the more religious Catholic
countries, cohabitation is spreading very slowly, most women prefer to bear
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children within marriage and majority of non-marital births occurs to lone
mothers.
Especially the Catholic Church is known for its emphasis on “traditional family
values” and frequent interventions into the domain of human reproduction, trying
to influence sex morality, sex education, family planning and abortion laws. In
Lithuania, the Catholic Church has curbed the introduction of the family planning
education (Karro, 1997, p. 15). In Poland, the Church was the main active force
promoting the ban on abortions established in 1993, it opposed the spread of
modern contraceptives and made obstructions to the introduction of sex education
(David and Titkow, 1994). Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988, p. 13) see the
secularization dimension to be the main factor of ideational changes:
“Secularization, in its institutional sense, is a conditio sine qua non for pluralism
and tolerance”. In Europe, Protestantism was more conductive for the progression
towards libertarian culture than the Catholic or Orthodox tradition (Lesthaeghe
and Moors 2000, p. 155). These findings may partly explain rapid spread of non-
marital births and cohabitation in the three secularized and traditionally mostly
Protestant societies. The influence of Orthodox Christianity is more difficult to
establish; Orthodox religion is not fiercely opposed to abortion or contraception,
but it may put emphasis on traditional family values or on the authority of the
state, especially in the more rural societies of Eastern Europe, such as Moldova.
On the basis of limited evidence, it appears that the relatively intensive increase in
the proportion of non-marital births in the Christian Orthodox countries is not
compensated by cohabitation and most non-marital children are born to single
mothers. It is difficult to judge whether this is an effect of the cultural-religious
tradition or of economic hardship, lack of men’s commitment and difficult
housing situation60.
                                                                
60 Paradoxically, higher degree of religiosity or traditionalism may negatively influence fertility in
the future. McDonald (2000) argued that in Western societies, individual-oriented institutions (such
as democracy, education or paid employment), once dominated by men, have gradually progressed
toward gender equity, which enabled women to pursue high education or to compete on the labor
market. At the same time, the progress toward gender equity within family has been advancing
slowly, establishing dilemma for many women if  “they perceive a potential future family role as
inconsistent with their aspirations as individuals” (p. 437). Persistent influence of religion (or
traditionalism), supporting “idealized family morality” may protect family organization from radical
change toward higher gender equity. As a result, many women hesitate to establish a family and
fertility falls to a very low level. Currently, this theory provides one of the plausible explanations of
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Despite the persistent influence of the old cultural and religious tradition, Eastern
Europe was subjected to many decades of the official promotion of Communist
ideology aiming to eradicate traditional religious believes and to gain complete
control over society61. Thus, the former communist countries form a distinctive
cluster on the global cultural map as “Communism left a clear imprint on the
value systems of those who lived under it” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, p. 31).
Apart from the effect of forced secularization, the influence of the communist
heritage on demographic behavior is less clear than the influence of the religious-
cultural tradition. Although the former communist countries display a small
degree of traditionalism and generally high level of rationalism and
secularization, they rank much lower than the other countries on the “self-
expression dimension” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, p. 45). Values like trust,
tolerance, subjective well being, political activism and self-expression, which are
often associated with profound demographic changes in Western Europe (van de
Kaa, 2001) are much less present in the ex-communist countries. The low
emphasis put on “postmodern” values may be caused by general feelings of
insecure and unpredictable life as well as by the past influence of the repressive
authoritarian regime (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, p. 45-46). We may speculate that
the widespread feelings of nostalgia and positive attitudes towards the “ancien
régime” will be a powerful force slowing the disappearance of the socialist
greenhouse environment and related patterns of reproduction. Especially in the
Post-Soviet Republics, previous system of state-organized bureaucratic socialism
is enjoying a considerable popularity. There, the social and economic
transformation brought about economic and social collapse, which resembles  “a
caricature of the vicious capitalism the old Communist propagandists warned the
masses about” (The Economist, 6.11.1999, p. 24).
In the past, surveys related to values and attitudes have shown that among people
living in Eastern Europe, an inconsistent mix of traditional and modern values
was strongly rooted. Most respondents agreed with the free access to abortion and
approved childbearing among single women. On the other hand, traditional
familism was strong there: quite few people considered marriage to be an
                                                                                                                                                                  
very low fertility in Southern Europe, which displays both higher religiosity and stronger familism
than Western and Northern European countries.
61 Inglehart (1997, p. 38) proposed that Communist ideology “provided a functional equivalent to
religion, furnishing an explanation of how the universe functioned and where history was going”.
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outdated institution, most of them thought that women need to have children to be
fulfilled and supported more emphasis on the family life. Recent evidence,
provided by the 1999 round of the European Values Study surveys, reveal that the
demographic changes over the 1990s occurred simultaneously with the ideational
change, characteristic also for the earlier demographic shifts in Western Europe.
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2002) found a substantial increase in the tolerance
toward new living arrangements and procreation outside marriage between 1990
and 1999 in all regions of Central and Eastern Europe. The proportion of
respondents who think that women do not need children for their life fulfillment,
that marriage is an outdated institution and motherhood among single women is
acceptable has increased by 10 to 25 % (ibid., p. 25). Many of these value
changes have their roots already in the communist era; nevertheless, their rapid
progression over the 1990s clearly marks the complex transformation of
reproductive patterns in Central and Eastern Europe. Irrespective of the economic
and social situation in particular countries of Eastern Europe, the return back to
the era of early and virtually universal childbearing, occurring almost exclusively
within marriage, seems impossible.
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5. CONCLUSION
What appears at first sight as a uniform decline in fertility rates spreading across
Central and Eastern Europe, was in fact a complex transformation of the previous
pattern of fertility connected with the collapse of the communist political system.
After 1989, within a period of ten years, post-communist countries in Europe have
become more differentiated with regard to the social and economic conditions as
well as in fertility behavior of their populations. Changes in fertility are part of a
broader transition in reproductive and family life marked by the spread of
alternative family forms, non-marital births, postponement of childbearing and
decline in fertility and marriage rates, which has been taking place in Western
European societies since the 1960s. In contrast with Western Europe, changes in
Central and Eastern Europe have frequently progressed with a breathtaking speed,
partly driven by the emerging economic constraints. The interconnectedness of
the changes in values, fertility behavior and family formation, however, clearly
points out the influence of the broader social transformation in all post-communist
societies.
This paper has outlined two different pathways of fertility change in Eastern
Europe over the 1990s. The first may be coined as a rapid transition from the
early to the late age at childbearing.  The intensive postponement of childbearing
went hand in hand with the low first-birth rates, decline in teenage fertility rates,
low first-marriage rates and low abortion levels. This pathway is typical of
countries, which experienced relatively successful social and economic
transformation, and where women may enjoy the advantages offered by the new
opportunities, such as prolonged education, more career choice or advanced
consumerism. In these societies, particularly in Central Europe, the old model of
reproduction marked by early and almost universal transitions to marriage and
motherhood has been rapidly loosing ground. Modern contraception, especially
the pill, spread quickly and the postponement of first birth was a dominant factor
depressing current period fertility rates. The second pathway, characterized by a
slow postponement of first births, higher first-birth rates, higher teenage fertility
rates, higher abortion rates and low birth rates of the second parity, is more
peculiar to countries undergoing deep social and economic crisis, in particular the
Post-Soviet republics. The old reproductive regime seems to be more strongly
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rooted there. At the same time, traditional cultural-religious division still plays an
important role in shaping the fertility change, with more religious and traditional
countries undergoing slower transitions and experiencing only a gradual diffusion
of alternative family forms.
Currently low fertility rates in Eastern Europe are very likely to remain low in the
next two decades. The postponement of first births will proceed further, as the
first mothers are on average still fairly young compared with other parts of
Europe. Since people are becoming more tolerant to non-traditional forms of
behavior and many new opportunities and constraints are competing with the
motherhood and family life, the conditions favorable for more differentiated
fertility strategies, new family forms, postponement and even giving up the births
will probably intensify. The destandardization of the life course as well as the
“convergence to diversity” – similar trends proceeding with a very different speed
in different countries – will continue. Non-discriminative access to employment
for women and possibilities to reconcile work with childcare will be among the
crucial factors for the future fertility trends. Societies, where the position of
women and their access to jobs will deteriorate, and societies, where the pressure
for women to follow traditional pathways of life will be strong, are likely to face
longer-lasting and more pronounced depression in the birth rates. Gradual
economic recovery may paradoxically stimulate further decline in fertility rates
and stronger postponement of first births in countries, where fertility decline has
been dominantly driven by the factors connected with the economic crisis.
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APPENDIX
Table AP-1: Characteristics of the socialist greenhouse environment in various
life domains
Education (secondary grammar schools, university education):
 -> Limited access, small enrolment (especially universities)
 -> Low attractiveness: education only loosely related to job opportunities and to the potential income level
 -> Education usually completed at an early stage in life (below age 20), with few opportunities for education 
      later in life
Career
 -> Shortage of labour force
 -> Full employment
 -> Promotion of employment of women
 -> Small income differences
 -> Limited choice, limited possibilities for the career (based more on political activities than on educational level)
 -> Small pressure, low-working intensity environment, no competition for jobs
Social security support and population policy
 -> Subsidies for the childcare institutions, various family and child-related benefits, payments and allowances
 -> Family and childcare support often pronatalist (money support progressively increasing with the number of
      children; in some countries (Romania, former USSR) special tax for unmarried persons
 -> Generally low costs of chilcare and childrearing
 ->  Provision of housing linked to the family status and to the number of children
Private life and family life
 -> Few opportunities for alternative lifestyles
 -> Attractiveness of marriage and family; "escape into the family": family was perceived as a source of privacy,
     freedom and provided space for self-realization. People could talk freely and trust each other within the family.
 -> Establishing a family was often the easiest way for "independent life" out of parental home: housing was 
    provided primarily for families of young couples
 -> Official familism
 -> Low attractiveness of cohabitation, and voluntary childlessness
 -> Relatively traditional gender division of work within family: most childcare provided by women, small repairs
    and household maintenance by men
 -> Limited offer of consumer goods, supply-restricted consumerism
Reproduction
 -> Lack of sex education and information regarding sexual life and contraception 
 -> First sex - usually premarital - mostly occurred without contraceptive use and often led to unplanned 
    pregnancy and subsequent "shotgun marriage"
 -> Limited access to modern contraception
 -> High reliance on abortions
 -> High proportion of unplanned, "mistimed" and "unwanted" conceptions meant that the fertility level was
    higher than intended
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Table AP-2: The effects of the dissolution of the socialist greenhouse on various
domains of life
Education (secondary grammar schools, university education):
 -> Sharp increase in the attractivity of education and in the proportion of young people studying at
      university
 -> Job and career prospects as well as wages linked to educational level
Career
 -> Thread of unemployment
 -> Increasing income differences by occupation, often by gender 
 -> Pressure for flexibility, further education and work commitment
 -> Prospects for career linked with education, initiative and present work performance
 -> Opportunities for private enterpreneurship
 -> Disadvantaged position of young women on the labour market: employment opportunities often related
    to reproductive intentions
Social security support and population policy
 -> Decline in the amount of state support for families with children
 -> Social benefits and allowances often dependent on income (only the low-income families entitled to
      certain benefits)
 -> Housing mostly available on the market principle
 -> No special advantages for "traditional" family
 -> Increased price of childcare, both in terms of expenditures and opportunity costs
Private life and family life
 -> Alternative lifestyles generally more accepted and tolerated
 -> More individualistic lifestyles, new consumer opportunities: "culture of consumption"
 -> Broad external "opportunity structure": freedom of expression, freedom to travel, to be engaged in a 
      career or to run own  business 
 -> Family is not anymore a domain for freedom and self-realizatrion
 -> "Westernization": media-promoted positive image of "independent women" and non-family lifestyles
 -> Economic crisis in some countries paradoxically lead to an increased importance of broader family for
      the fulfillment of basic needs of its memebers
Reproduction
 -> Sex education and modern contraception generally available
 -> Explosion of information: sex, contraception and reproductive life are frequently and openly discussed
      in the media
  -> Rapid increase in the use of modern contraception and in the the control over reproduction from the 
      onset of sexual life
 -> Decresed reliance on abortions, end of the Eastern European "abortion culture"
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Table AP-3: Estimates of the tempo-effect in the period fertility changes, 1985-1997/99 (Bongaarts-
Feeney adjustment)
Avg. TFR Adj.TFR (avg.) TFR decline Decline Decline due Effects:
TFR 1985 1997-99 1997-99 1985-98 due quantum timing % quantum % timing
(1) (2) (3) (4) = (2) - (1) (5) = (3) - (1) (6) = (4) - (5) (7) = (5) / (4) (8) = (6) / (4)
Central Europe
Czech Republic 1.96 1.15 1.67 -0.81 -0.29 -0.52 36.3 63.7
Hungary   1) 1.85 1.35 1.71 -0.50 -0.14 -0.36 28.6 71.4
Poland 2.33 1.44 1.74 -0.89 -0.59 -0.30 66.4 33.6
Slovak Republic 2.25 1.38 1.77 -0.87 -0.49 -0.39 56.0 44.0
Slovenia 1.72 1.23 1.67 -0.49 -0.05 -0.44 11.2 88.8
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 1.95 1.14 1.38 -0.81 -0.57 -0.24 70.5 29.5
Romania 2.32 1.31 1.51 -1.01 -0.81 -0.20 80.1 19.9
Baltic states
Estonia 2.12 1.24 1.61 -0.88 -0.51 -0.37 58.0 42.0
Latvia 2.09 1.13 1.56 -0.96 -0.53 -0.43 55.4 44.6
Lithuania 2.09 1.37 1.63 -0.72 -0.45 -0.26 63.2 36.8
Post-Soviet republics
Russia 2) 2.11 1.35 1.47 -0.76 -0.64 -0.12 83.9 16.1
Notes:
1) Recent figures refer to the 1997-98 period 2) Recent figures refer to 1995 only
AdjTFR Bongaarts-Feeney (1998) adjusted TFR based on changes in the mean age of mothers by parity
Decline due quantum Estimated TFR decline attributed to the decline in fertility level
Decline due timing Estimated TFR decline attributed to changes in fertility timing (postponement of births)
Data sources: Council of Europe (2000), EUROSTAT (2001, 2002), CSU (2000b), GUS (1998-99), Steshenko (2000) 
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Table AP-4: Selected indicators of economic development, technology and institutional quality
GDP PPP Real GDP HDI HDI Inflation % food Change Modern Institution
1998 ($) 1989-99 1998 1990-98 1990-99 (%) 1998 in e0 M technology index
Central Europe
Croatia 6698 77.9 0.795 0.009 290.8 40.0 1.8 .. 0.3
Czech Republic 12197 95.3 0.843 0.013 15.3 26.8 3.0 81.5 6.8
Hungary 9832 99.4 0.817 0.019 21.4 42.1 0.9 89.1 8.7
Poland 7543 121.8 0.814 0.029 66.9 36.9 2.0 37.7 7.0
Slovak Republic 9624 101.7 0.825 0.013 11.9 31.8 1.6 56.4 2.8
Slovenia 14400 105.3 0.861 0.021 98.5 26 (1997) 2.0 87.4 8.5
Former GDR .. 98.5 (1998) .. .. .. .. 2.2 (89-97) ..
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 4683 70.7 0.772 -0.010 160.0 53.5 -0.7 11.3 0.1
Romania 5572 75.8 0.770 -0.001 110.2 58.0 -0.3 17.4 -0.8
Baltic states
Estonia 7563 78.3 0.801 -0.005 124.1 37.5 0.0 150.3 6.1
Latvia 5777 59.6 0.771 -0.026 131.1 44.9 -1.3 50.6 2.6
Lithuania 6283 64.2 0.789 -0.020 162.3 46.0 -1.2 47.9 2.6
Post-Soviet republics
Belarus 6314 81.4 0.781 -0.023 535.8 .. -4.1 0.9 -7.6
Moldova 1995 31.3 0.700 -0.057 261.8 .. -1.3 1.0 -2.0
Russia 6180 57.6 0.771 -0.041 315.9 57.5 -2.9 7.0 -5.4
Ukraine 3130 39.3 0.744 -0.049 670.2 .. -2.9 2.5 -5.8
GDP PPP 1998 ($) GDP per capita in purchasing power parity in 1998, US Dollars
Real GDP 1989-99 Index of real GDP in 1999, 1989=100
HDI 1998 Human Development Index 1998
HDI 1990-98 Absolute change in Human Development Index 1990-98
Inflation 1990-99 (%) Average inflation rate 1990-99 (arithmetic average)
% food 1998 Household expenditures on food, alcohol and tobacco 1998 (% of all expenditures)
Change in e0 M Change in the life expectancy of men at birth in 1989-1998
Modern technology Index combining number of mobile phones per 1000 inhabitants and Internet connections per 10000 inhabitants in 1999
(both indicators divided by 2)
Institution index Index based on the following components: extent of democracy, government effectiveness, extent of regulation, 
rule of law and extent of corruption
Sources: UN HDR (2000), UN ECE (2000(2), 2001), Council of Europe (2000, 2001), FV (2000), EUROSTAT (2001, 2002), Zohhori et al. (1999)
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Table AP-5: Selected indicators of employment, unemployment and labor force
F labour force Registered Survey unem. F unem. F/M unem. Youth unem. % LF % LF Gender pay
(% in 1998) unem.(%, 99) % (LFS 98) % (LFS '98) LFS (index 98) % (LFS 98) agric. (98) indust. (98) ratio (96)
Central Europe
Croatia .. 20.8 11.6 12.8 1.10 30.9 16.5 29.6 ..
Czech Republic 43.8 9.4 6.5 8.2 1.26 12.4 5.5 41.0 81.3
Hungary 44.8 9.6 7.8 7.0 0.90 13.5 7.5 34.2 78.1 (97)
Poland 44.9 12.8 10.6 12.3 1.16 23.2 25.2 29.5 79.0
Slovak Republic 44.9 18.2 16.1 (99) 13.2 1.06 23.6 7.7 35.5 78.2
Slovenia 45.9 12.8 7.9 8.0 1.01 18.3 6.7 41.6 85.4
Former GDR .. 17.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria .. 17.0 16.0 15.9 0.99 36.0 26.2 30.6 69.1 (97)
Romania 45.7 11.3 6.9 (99) 6.1 0.97 18.3 38.1 30.7 76.2 (97)
Baltic states ..
Estonia 48.4 6.6 12.3 (99) 8.9 0.90 15.7 9.1 33.2 72.6
Latvia 47.1 13.8 13.8 14.1 1.02 25.5 17.6 24.4 79.9 (98)
Lithuania 48.4 13.3 13.3 12.2 0.92 22.2 21.4 27.1 71.0 (97)
Post-Soviet republics 
Belarus .. 2.3 (98) .. .. .. 16.4 35.1 ..
Moldova .. 1.9 (98) 14 .. .. 45.8 (95) .. ..
Russia .. 2.2 12.6 (99) 11.3 0.93 14.1 30.1 69.5
Ukraine .. 11.3 11.3 .. .. 22.4 26.7 77.7
Notes:
F labour force (% in 1998)   Female labor force as % of labor force (data from the Labor Force Surveys (LFS))
Registered unem. (%, 99)   Officially registered unemployment rate in 1999, %
Survey unem. % (LFS 98)   Unemployment rate in 1998 based on the LFS surveys, %
F unem. % (LFS '98)   Female unemployment rate in 1998 based on the LFS survey
F/M unemployment LFS (index '98)   Index of female / male unemployment rate (LFS, 1998)
Youth unem. % (LFS 98)   Youth (age 15-24) unemployment rate in 1998 (LFS surveys)
% LF agric. (98)   Proportion of labor force employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing (1998, LFS)
% LF industr. (98)   Proportion of labor force employed in industry and construction (1998, LFS)
Gender pay ratio (96)   Female monthly wages as a percentage of male monhly wages in 1996
Sources: UN ECE (2000 (2)), EUROSTAT (2001), FV (2000), TransMONEE 2000, UNICEF (1999)
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Table AP-6: Education: Proportion of young people in education, %
Total 1998 Total 1998 M 1998 F 1998 index F/M Tertiary Tertiary Abs. change
15-19 20-24 20-24 20-24 20-24 1990 1998 1990-98
Central Europe
Croatia .. .. .. .. .. 14.1 ('91) 17.8 3.7
Czech Republic 77.1 19.2 19.7 18.6 0.94 13.9 16.9 3.0
Hungary 77.5 21.9 20.1 23.7 1.17 12.2 27.4 15.2
Poland 81.0 31.3 29.5 33.3 1.13 13.5 34.2 20.7
Slovak Republic .. .. .. .. .. 14.0 19.6 5.6
Slovenia 80.5 27.8 23.3 32.6 1.40 13.1 29.1 16.0
Former GDR .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 61.4 24.0 19.3 28.8 1.49 21.7 32.4 10.7
Romania 56.4 16.0 15.3 16.8 1.10 8.1 17.3 9.2
Baltic states
Estonia 76.0 24.9 22.1 28.0 1.27 20.1 32.9 12.8
Latvia 73.0 24.2 19.8 28.6 1.45 20.6 42.0 21.4
Lithuania 74.7 21.1 17.0 25.4 1.50 20.1 23.7 3.6
Post-Soviet republics 
Belarus .. .. .. .. .. 22.9 27.7 4.8
Moldova .. .. .. .. .. 15.8 20.1 4.3
Russia .. .. .. .. .. 24.5 28.2 3.7
Ukraine .. .. .. .. .. 21.9 27.9 6.0
Sources: calculated from the EUROSTAT (2001, 2002) data and TransMONEE 2000 database (tertiary education)
Notes:
Tertiary Tertiary gross enrollment rate: Proportion of young people aged 19-24 in tertiary education
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Table AP-7: Parity-specific indicators of period fertility in Central and Eastern Europe in 1980-1999
a) Total fertility rate of parity 1
1980 1985 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Central-Eastern Europe
Czech Republic 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.64 0.56 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53
Hungary 0.91 0.87 0.82 0.68 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56
Poland 0.90 0.92 0.85 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.60
Slovak Republic 0.92 0.93 0.88 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57
Slovenia 1.02 0.87 0.71 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.60
Former GDR 0.94 0.90 0.89 ('89) .. .. .. .. .. ..
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria  1/ 0.97 0.91 0.90 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.65 0.69
Romania 0.96 0.85 0.75 0.74 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.67
Baltic states 
Estonia .. .. .. .. 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.60 0.63
Latvia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.58 0.56 0.59
Lithuania 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.78 0.76 0.71 0.68 0.65 0.64
Post-soviet republics 
Moldova .. .. 1.08 .. .. 0.77 .. .. ..
Russia  2/ .. .. 0.99 0.85 0.83 0.79 .. 0.72 ..
Ukraine .. .. 0.99 ('89) 0.84 .. .. .. .. ..
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Table AP-7 b): Total fertility rate of parity 2
1980 1985 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Central-Eastern Europe
Czech Republic 0.81 0.74 0.71 0.55 0.51 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.43
Hungary 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.57 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.44 0.42
Poland 0.76 0.80 0.67 0.56 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.43
Slovak Republic 0.80 0.79 0.74 0.57 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.44
Slovenia 0.81 0.67 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.46 0.44
Former GDR 0.69 0.63 0.60 ('89) .. .. .. .. .. ..
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria  1/ 0.79 0.77 0.68 0.47 0.42 0.42 0.34 0.35 0.39
Romania  2/ 0.74 0.73 0.54 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38
Baltic states 
Estonia .. .. .. .. 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.42
Latvia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.34 0.34 0.37
Lithuania 0.70 0.75 0.72 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.47
Post-soviet republics 
Moldova .. .. 0.80 .. .. 0.54 .. .. ..
Russia  3/ .. .. 0.64 0.38 0.37 0.35 .. 0.37 ..
Ukraine .. .. 0.70 ('89) 0.45 .. .. .. .. ..
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Table AP-7 c): Total fertility rate of parity 3 and higher
1980 1985 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Central-Eastern Europe
Czech Republic 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18
Hungary 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.30
Poland 0.59 0.61 0.54 0.54 0.46 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.33
Slovak Republic 0.60 0.54 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.32
Slovenia 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
Former GDR 0.25 0.25 0.19 ('89) .. .. .. .. .. ..
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria  1/ 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.15
Romania  2/ 0.75 0.68 0.54 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Baltic states 
Estonia .. .. .. .. 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.23
Latvia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.19 0.19 0.21
Lithuania 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24
Post-soviet republics 
Moldova .. .. 0.51 .. .. 0.30 .. .. ..
Russia  3/ .. .. 0.28 0.14 0.14 0.13 .. 0.14 ..
Ukraine .. .. 0.24 ('89) 0.17 .. .. .. .. ..
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Table AP-7 d): Mean age of women at birth of first child; based on the distribution of fertility schedule
(reduced rates)
1980 1985 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Central Europe
Croatia 22.8 23.3 23.8 24.8 25.0 25.0 25.2 25.4 25.4
Czech Republic 22.37 22.35 22.47 22.92 23.32 23.68 24.04 24.35 24.59
Hungary 22.45 22.80 23.10 23.59 23.81 24.07 24.26 24.53 24.84
Poland 23.4 23.8 23.31 23.64 23.75 23.87 24.03 24.15 24.33
Slovak Republic 22.69 22.62 22.65 22.82 23.00 23.17 23.38 23.59 23.82
Slovenia 22.83 23.10 23.72 24.63 24.93 25.20 25.52 25.83 26.13
Former GDR 23.5 24.1 24.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 21.9 21.9 22.0 22.17 22.38 22.54 22.78 22.91 22.98
Romania 22.43 22.60 22.59 22.77 22.97 23.14 23.27 23.43 23.52
Baltic states
Estonia 23.2 23.2 22.9 22.8 23.04 23.19 23.42 23.63 23.80
Latvia 22.9 23.0 23.04 23.28 23.33 23.47 23.83 24.00 24.18
Lithuania 23.79 23.53 23.24 23.02 23.16 23.20 23.40 23.60 23.77
Post-Soviet republics 
Belarus .. .. 22.61 22.36 22.41 22.50 22.47 22.62 ..
Moldova .. .. 22.28 .. .. 22.19 .. .. ..
Russia  22.99 22.91 22.72 22.37 22.47 22.64 .. 23.16 ..
Ukraine .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Data sources: EUROSTAT (2001, 2002), Council of Europe (2000, 2001), CNPS (1990-1995), CSU (2000b), GUS (1991-94),  
HCSO (1981-1995), Steshenko (2000), CNPS (1998), DASS (1999), Philipov and Kohler (1999), FSU (1981-89 (1) and (2)),  
Boleslawski (1993), Zeman (1998), Barkalov and Dorbritz (1996), Sircelj (2000) and unpublished data 
Notes: 
1/ Data for 1980-1990 computed from rates by 5-year age groups
2/ Data for 1980 and 1985 computed from rates by 5-year age groups
3/ Data for 1998 computed from rates by 5-year age groups
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